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THE 


OXFORD ELEMENTS 


OF 


LOGIC , 

Sin dfour JSooftg, 

FOR THE PURPOSE OF SELF-INSTRUCTION. 

BEING 

A TRANSLATION, 


WITH 

A running illustrative commentary 


OF THE 



ELEMENTA LOGICAL 



Uonifon: 


Printed by TV* Green, 4, Grange-Court, Carey Street, 

FORTFIE PROPRIETORS,MILITARY CHRONICLE AND MILITARY CLASSICS* 
OFFICE, 14, CIIARLOTTE-STREET, BLOOMSBURY, AND TO BE 
HAD OF ALL THE BOOKS ELLERS,-—! 81(5. 











































































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4 


























ADVERTISEMENT 


The following system of Logic is upon the plan recommended 
by Mr. Locke, that of retaining so much of the forms and defi¬ 
nitions of Aristotle as is useful for a close and methodical rea? 
soning, and rejecting so much as is merely formal; and thereby 
at once keeping pace with the progress of the age, and still re¬ 
taining somewhat of the exactness, the precision, and the pro¬ 
fundity of the philosopher who first analysed and distributed the 
faculties of the Understanding. 

In executing this purpose of adapting the Oxford Elements to 
Self-Instbuction, the editor has found it necessary not to con¬ 
fine himself to a mere litteral translation of that work. No book 
extant, perhaps, exhibits so full,and yet so compressed a view of 
the system of Aristotle as these Oxford Elements; but as they 
presume the presence of a professor or tutor, they would not be 
always so immediately intelligible by the Self-Instructor. To 
obviate this difficulty, the editor has had recourse to two modes; 
the first, that of a free, and sometimes paraphrastic translation of 
the close language of the Oxford Elements, and secondly, to a 
kind of running Commentary, or Illustrative Explanation, of the 
whole. He has not separated the illustration from the text, 
because it would have impaired the uniformity, and therein 
perhaps much of the utility of the work. 

The authors employed in this illustration are the other logical 
writers. Watts, Duncan, Wallis, £cc.; and as it is no part of the 
design of the editor to lay claim to any merit of his own, he has 
employed them as fully and as often as the purpose of illustra¬ 
tion required. The work of Watts is good as far as the author 
intended it; its main defect is in the nearly total omission of the 
system, the terms, and the definitions of Aristotle; arid in the 
want of that precision, condensation, and closeness, of which 
Aristotle is the master to all who have read him. Duncan’s is 
a loose, general, and unmethodical treatise. Wallis exceeds them 
all, but is in Latin, and requires much illustration. The Oxford 
Elements have superseded the use of Wallis. In the translation 
of these elements, which is now submitted to the reader, the 
editor has endeavoured to unite the distinctive excellence of all; 
the exactness, the method, and the science of the schools, with 
the more full and general system required for life and daily 
business. 







I * 




THE 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

BOOK L 


OF PERCEPTION OR SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 


Definitions. 

LOGIC is the art of using our reason in the discovery and 
communication of Truth. 

The end of Logic is the discovery of Truth. 

The object of Logic is the Human Understanding. 

The subject of Logic is all that we see, hear, perceive, or 
understand. 

The operations of the mind are three,— Perception , Judgment , 
and Reasoning . 

Perception , otherwise called Simple Apprehension, is that act 
or faculty of the mind, by which it sees, perceives, or contemplates, 
whatever is offered to it. The form, image, or picture, which is 
jthus impressed upon the mind of the thing perceived, is called an 
Idee k Thus if I see a horse, a man, or a tree, the form of the horse, 
man, or tree, which thence enters into my mind, is called the 
idea of the horse. In the same manner, if I meditate upon life, 
death, grammar, logic, &c., the form of them, as they exist in my 
mind, are ideas of them. Perception, therefore, is to the mind 
what vision is to the eye; and the mind may be further regarded 
as the Retina, upon which the images of things paint themselves 
like objects upon the eye. 

Judgment is that aet or faculty of the mind, by which it com¬ 
pares two ideas together, and thus perceiving their agreement or 
disagreement, affirms or denies the one of the other. Thus if I 




6 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


book r f 


compare my idea of a tree, and my idea of height, I perceive that 
they agree,and thence affirm that the tree is high. 

Reasoning is that actor faculty of the mind, by which we 
compare two or more judgments (propositions) and thence infer 
a third. 

As an idea is the picture of a thing perceived, so a Word, or 
term, is thp sign, index, or expression of an i,dea ; and as our ideas 
can only be known by words, so the subject matter of Logic com¬ 
prehends as well words as ideas. 

The result of the mind, acting in its first operation, Perception, 
is a simple idea. The expression of this idea, in one or more 
words, is called a term; or in the technical Latin used by Logi¬ 
cians, and which it is necessary to remember, because frequent 
use has almost adopted itinto our own language. Vox Simplex. 

The result of the mind, acting in its second operation, judg¬ 
ment, is the perceiving the agreement of two ideas. The ex¬ 
pression of this agreement, in words, is a sentence, which is 
called logically a proposition, or in the technical Latin, a Vox 
Complexa. 

The result and process of the mind, acting in its third operation, 
reasoning, is the seeking and perceiving the agreement or con¬ 
trary of two ideas, by a comparison of each with a third. This 
result and process, as expressed in words, consists of three 
propositions, which taken together, are called a Syllogism, Argu¬ 
ment, or sometimes technically, a Vox Decpmplexa . 

According to these three operations of the mind, Logic is 
divided into three parts. 

The first treats of Perception or Simple apprehension, that is 
of ideas and the words by which they are expressed. 

The second of Judgment and Propositions. 

The third of Reasoning and Syllogisms. 

To which is usually added, by modern Logicians, a fourth part 
or book, upon method, or the disposition cf arguments and 
discourse. 


CHAPTER I. 

Of the nature of Ideas, 

PERCEPTION, as above defined it, is that act or faculty of 
the understanding, by which it perceives external objects, or its 
©\yn internal acts. The image, or notionary form, which the 


&o6k i. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


1 


mind receives from 9 uch perception, is an idea. Thus ifl see a 
horse, a tree, ora man, if I meditate upon life, death, and immor¬ 
tality, the notion or forms of such hor 9 e, tree, man, life, &c, 
which thence enter my mind, are my ideas of them. In the same 
manner, the notions of hunger, cold, wish, fear, &c. are my ideas 
t)f hunger, cold, &c. 

And as such horse, man, and tree, are the outward objects of 
my perception, and therein the outward archetypes or patterns 
of my ideas of them, 90 my own sensations of hunger, cold, &c 
are also the inward archetypes or patterns of my ideas concerning 
them. 

Among ail these ideas, such as represent bodies are generally 
called images, and especially if the idea of form be included. Oil 
the other hand, our inward ideas, such as our notions of thought, 
love, hatred, spirit, &c. belong more especially to the mind, and 
Carry nothing of shape or sense in them. 

CHAPTER II. 

OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION* 


SECTION I. 

Of Being in general , and the five Classes or Predicables , in one or uihef 
of which all our Ideas , with respect to Being or Essence , must fall . 

Essence or Being, is the nature of any thing, whether ac¬ 
tually, or only possibly existing. A being therefore is considered 
as possible, or as actual. 

If considered as possible, it is said to have an essence, or nature. 
If considered as actual, it is said to have existence also* 

If we compare two or more things, which appear to agree gene¬ 
rally, but to differ in particulars* we shall see that they agree either 
according to their whole essence, or according to a part of their 
essence; or according to some neeessary or contingent conjunct of 
their essence. If they agree according to their whole essence, 
and differ only in severalty or individually (that is to say, in being 
different individuals) they are said to be of the same species . If 
they agree according to a part only of their essence, and differ in 
severalty and in species, they are said to be of the same genus. 
That part of the essence in which they differ, and which consti¬ 
tutes each to be of the species which it is, is what is logically 
termed, their difference . If they agree according to a necessary 



8 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK I. 


conjunct of their essence, they are said to agree in property . If 
they agree only in a contingent or incidental, they are said to agree 

in accident 

Species, therefore, is a word or term for a number of individuals, 
agreeingin the whole of their common nature, and differing only 
in severalty (in numbers), i. e. in being different as individuals- 
Thus man is the species of Plato, Socrates, &c. who agree in the 
common nature of humanity, but are several as individuals. 

Genus is a word or term for a number of species, agreeing 
together in a part of their nature, but differing in that remainder 
which constitutes them several species. Thus animal is the ge¬ 
nus of men, beasts, &c. who agree in the common nature of ani¬ 
mality, but who differ as to that rationality, irrationality, &c. 
which constitutes the one species men, and the other beasts. 

Difference is a word or term for that part of the essence, which, 
in the distribution of a genus into its species, constitutes each 
species what it is. Thus if we distribute the genus animal into 
man, beast, &c.—rationality is that which constitutes man, ir¬ 
rationality that which constitutes beasts. Rationality, therefore, 
is what is logically termed the Difference,—or more frequently, 
the Specific Difference. 

A Property is a word or term for some attribute or quality of a 
thing, which though not regarded primarily as a part of its es¬ 
sence, necessarily flows or follows from such essence. Thus 
feeling is a property of life; and laughing, or the faculty of laugh¬ 
ing, the property of humanity. 

An Accident is a word or term for such an attribute or quality, 
as is not necessary to the being of a thing, and makes no part of 
its essence, but is merely incidental, and as such may be present 
or absent without affecting the being of that thing. Thus the 
whiteness, blackness, roughness, smoothness, &c.of a man or beast. 

The above five terms, Genus, Species, Difference, Property, 
and Accident, are what are termed by Aristotle the five Predi¬ 
cables, that is to say, the five classes, to one or the other of w,hich 
all our ideas, respecting the essence of things, must belong. And 
as they are frequently referred to by our philosophical writers 
under this common name, it is necessary to remember them, and 
their respective definitions. 

As the term animal isa genus, if considered with respectto man, 
beasts, birds, fishes, &c., but will become itself a species, if it be 
considered with respect to a higher genus, as created matter; so 
it is manifest that some general terms may become, in different 
uses, both a genus and a species. Such Genera are called 


BOOL T. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


9 


Subaltern. But the highest genus, i. e. that beyond which 
there is nothing more general, and which never becomes a species* 
is called, the Summum Genus. And there is the same distinction 
with respect to Species; some being Subaltern, and others a 
Species infim a* 


SECTION II. 

Of Substance audits nine Modes , making together the ten Predicaments 

or Categories of Aristotle ,— i. e , those ten Classes , to one or other of 

which all our ideas , respecting any substance and its qualities , must 
belong. 

EVERY being must be considered either as subsisting in and 
by itself, and is then called a substance, oras it subsists in and by 
another, and is then called a Mode or manner of being. 

A Substance is a being which subsists by itself, without de¬ 
pendence upon any other created being. The notion of subsisting 
by itself gives occasion to Logicians to call it a substance. So a 
horse, a house, stone, water, a spirit, a body, an angel, are called 
substances, because they depend upon nothing but God for their 
existence. 

A Mode is that which cannot subsist by itself, but must sub¬ 
sist in and by another. 

Now as all the possible modes, or manners of any substances 
being, are comprehended according to Aristotle in nine classes, and 
as substance itself must be the ground, or subject matter of all our 
ideas, so he terms the ten together, (i. e, Substance and its nine 
Modes,) the Ten Predicaments or Categories ; that is to say, the ten 
classes, to one or other of which all our ideas must belong. 

The first Predicament is therefore Substance , which s defined 
to be that which subsists by itself, and as the base, ground, or 
subject, of all its fmodesand properties. 

The second Predicament (and first of the modes) is Quantity , 
which is an accident, according to which a thing is said to be so 
many, or so much, in quantity, or number, as,— hree feet, an 
ounce, &c. 

* Where I retain these Latin terms, it is because frequent use have rendered 
them a part of our own language, and because it is necessary to familiarize the 
reader to words which are of such frequent occurrence in the writings of our di¬ 
vines, philosophers, and even parliamentary speakers. 

No. I. B 


10 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK 1 i 


The third Predicament is Quality , an accident, according to 
which a thing is said to be such as it is in quality ; as learned* 
ingenious, white, &c. 

The fourth Predicament is Relation , which is the respect or 
regard that one thing bears to another, as father and son, &c. 

The fifth is Action , and the sixth Passion , the one of which is 
doing, and the other suffering ; as to strike,—to be stricken. 

The seventh Predicament is Place ,—the eighth Time , the 
ninth Position, and the tenth, the quality of Hating external in¬ 
vestments, such as clothes, ornaments, riches, &c. 

The above ten classes, i. e. Substance, and its nine Modes, 
(Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, Time, Place, 
Position, and Having) make up those ten Predicaments, which 
were formerly so celebrated in the schools, and upon each of 
which so many volumes have been written. It is necessary to know 
and even to remember their names, because they are frequently 
referred to by our elder writers, and because the incomparable ' 
subtility of their inventor deserves at least that the names of his 
distinctions should not be forgotten. 


SECTION III. 

Of the Modern Doctrine and Distribution of Modes. 

THE distribution of Aristotle, as above explained, has been 
supplanted by a doctrine at once more simple, equally suf¬ 
ficient, and having a better foundation in useful and intelligible 
distinctions. 

According to this doctrine, which is the System of Logic in 
present use, Being is first divided as by Aristotle into Substance 
and Modes; and his definition of Substance and Mode is like¬ 
wise retained. 

A mode therefore is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, 
but is always esteemed as belonging to, and subsist ing by the help 
of some substance, which, for that reason, is called its subject. 
A mode must depend on that substance for its very existenceand 
being; and that not as a being depends on its cause (for so sub¬ 
stances themselves depend on God their creator), but the very 
being of a mode depends on some substance for its subject, in 
which it is, or to which it belongs; so motion, shape, quantity, 
weight, are modes of the body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, 
doubting, judging, are modes of the mind; for the one cannot 


KOOK 1. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


11 


Subsist without body, and the other cannot subsist without mind, 

Modes have their several divisions, as well as substances. 

I. Modes are either essential or accidental. 

An essential mode or attribute is that which belongs to the very 
nature or essence of the subject wherein it is ; and the subject 
can never have the same nature without it. Such is roundness in 
a bowl, hardness in a stone, softness in water, vital motion in an 
animal, solidity in matter, thinking in a spirit: for though that 
piece of wood which is now a bowl may be made square, yet if 
roundness be taken away it is no longer a bowl; so that very 
flesh and bones, which is now an animal, may be without life or 
inward motion, but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no longer 
an animal, but a carcase; so if a body or matter be divested of so¬ 
lidity, it is a mere void space or nothing; and if spirit be en¬ 
tirely without thinking, I have no idea of any thing that is 
left in it; therefore, so far as 1 am able to judge, consciousness 
must be its essential attribute; thus all the perfections of God arje 
called his attributes, for he cannot be without them. 

An essential mode is either primary or secondary. 

A primary essential mode is the first or chief thing that con? 
Stitutes any being in its particular essence or nature, and makes 
it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from all other beings: 
this is called the difference in the definition of things, of which 
hereafter: so roundness is the primary essential mode, or differ¬ 
ence of a bowl : the meeting of two lines is the primary essential 
mode or the difference of an angle: the perpendicularity of these, 
lines to each other is the difference of a right angle: solid extention 
is the attribute or difference of matter : consciousness, or at least a 
power of thinking, is the difference or primary attribute of a 
spirit: and to fear and love God is the primary attribute of a 
pious man. 

A secondary essential mode is any other attribute of a thing, 
which is not of a primary consideration; this is called a property. 
Sometimes indeed it goes towards making up the essence, espe¬ 
cially of a complex being, so far as we are acquainted with it: 
sometimes it depends upon, and follows from the essence of it: 
so volubility, or aptness to roll, is the property of a bowl, and is 
derived from its roundness. Mobility and figure, or shape, are 
properties of matter; and it is the property of a pious man to love 
his neighbour. 

An accidental mode, or an accident, is such a mode as is not 
necessary to the being of a thing : for the subject may be without 


12 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK I, 


it, and yet remain of the same nature that it was before; or it is 
that mode which may be separated or abolished from its subject; 
so smoothness or roughnees, blackness or whiteness, motion or 
rest, are the accidents of a bowl; for these may be all changed, 
and yet the body remain a bowl still. Learning, justice, folly, 
sickness, health, are the accidents of a man ; motion, squareness, 
or any particular shape or size, are the accidents of a body; yet 
shape and size in general are essential modes of it; for a body 
must have some size and shape, nor can it be without them; so 
hope, fear, wishing, assenting, and doubting, are accidents of the 
fnind, though thinking in general seems to be essential to it. 

Here it should be noted also, that though the word property 
be limited sometimes in logical treatises to the secondary essential 
mode, yet it is used in common language to signify these four 
sorts of modes, of which some are essential, and some accidental, 

(1.) Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but not only 
to those subjects. So yellow colour and ductility are properties of 
gold; they belong to all gold; but not only to gold, for saffron is 
also yellow, and lead is ductile, 

(2.) Such as belong only to one kind of subject, but not to every 
subject of that kind. So learning, reading, and writing, are pro¬ 
perties of human nature ; they belong only to man, but not to all 
men. 

(3.) Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and only to 
them, but not always. So speech or language is a property of 
man, for it belongs to all men, and to men only: but men are not 
always speaking. 

(4.) Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and to them 
only and always. So shape and divisibility are properties of body; 
so omniscience and omnipotence are properties of the divine na¬ 
ture; for in this sense properties and attributes are the same; and 
except in logical treatises, there is scarce any distinction made 
between them. These are called propria quarto modq in the 
schools, or properties of the fourth sort. 

II. The second division of modes is into absolute and relative. 
An absolute mode is that which belongs to its subject, without 
respect to any other beings whatsoever: but a relative mode is 
derived from the regard that one being has to others. So round¬ 
ness and smoothness are the absolute modes of a bowl; for if 
there was nothing else existing in the whole creation, a bowl 
might be round and smooth ; but greatness and smallness are re¬ 
lative modes; for the very ideas of them arc derived merely from 


BOOK I. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC: 


13 


the comparison of one being with others. A bowl of four inches 
diameter is very great compared with one of an inch and a half; 
but it is very small in comparisons another bowl, whosediameter 
is eighteen or twenty inches. Motion is the absolute mode of a 
body, but swiftness or slowness are relative ideas; for the motion 
of a bowl on a bowling-green is swift, when compared with a 
snail; and is slow when compared with a cannon bullet. 

These relative modes are largely treated of by some meta¬ 
physical writers, under the name of relation; and these relations 
themselves are farther subdivided into such as arise from the na¬ 
ture of things, and such as arise merely from the operation of our 
mind. One sort are called real relations, the other mental; so the 
likeness of one egg to another is a real relation, because it arises 
from the real nature of things; for whether there was any manor 
mind to conceive it or no, one egg would be like another; but 
when we consider an egg as a noun substantive in grammar, or as 
signified by the letters e, g, g, these are mental relations, and de¬ 
rive their very nature from the mind of man. These sort of rela¬ 
tions are called by the schools entia rationis, or second notions, 
which have no real being but by the operations of the mind. 

III. The third division of mode shews us they are either in- 
trinsical or extrinsical. Intrinsical modes are conceived to be in 
the subject or substance, as when we say a globe is round, or 
swift, rolling, or at rest; or when we say a man is tall or learned, 
these are intrinsic modes; but extrinsic modes are such as arise 
from something that is not in the substance or subject itself; but 
it is a manner of being which some substances attain, by reason 
of something that is external or foreign to the subject; as, this 
globe lies within two yards of the wall; or, this man is beloved, 
or hated. Such sort of modes as this last example are called ex¬ 
ternal denominations. 

IV. There is a fourth division, whereby modes are said to be 
inherent or adherent; that is, proper or improper. Adherent or 
improper modesarising from the joining of some accidental sub¬ 
stance to the chief subject, which yet may be separated from it; 
so when a bowl is wet, or a boy is cloathed, these are adherent 
modes; for the water and the cloaths are distinct substances, 
which adhere to the bowl or to the boy; but when we say the 
bowl is swift or round, when we say the boy is strong or witty, 
these are proper or inherent modes, for they have a sort of in-being 
in the substance itself, and do notarise from the addition of any 
other substance to it. 


14 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK f. 


V. Action and passion are modes or manners which belong to, 
substances, and should not entirely be omitted here. When a, 
smith with a hammer strikes a piece of iron, the hammer and the 
smith are both agents or subjects of action; the one is the prime 
or supreme, the other the subordinate ; the iron is the patient, or 
the subject of passion, in a philosophical sense, because it receives 
the operation of the agent; though this sense of the words passion 
and patient differs much from the vulgar meaning of them. 

VI. The sixth division of inodes is into physical, that is, na¬ 
tural, civil, moral, and supernatural. So when we consider the 
apostle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman by the privilege of 
his birth, a man of virtue or honesty, and an inspired apostle; his 
low stature is a physical mode, his being a Roman is a civil pri¬ 
vilege, his honesty is a moral consideration, and his being inspired 
is supernatural. 

VII. Modes belong either to body or to spirit, or to both. 
Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporeal beings; and 
these are shape, size, situation, or place, &c. Modes of spirit be¬ 
long tomind ; such are knowledge,assent,dissent, doubting,reason¬ 
ing, See, Modes which belong to both have been sometimes called 
mixed modes, or human modes; for these are only found inhuman 
nature, which is compounded both of body and spirit; such are 
sensation, imagination, passion, See. in ail which there is aconcur- 
rence of the operations both of mind and body, that is, of animal 
and intellectual nature. 

VIII. I might add, in the last place, that as modes belong to sub¬ 
stances, so there are some also that are hut modes of other modes ; 
for though they subsist in and by the substance, as the original 
subject of them, yet they are properly and directly attributed to 
some mode of that substance. Motion is the mode of a body; 
but the'swiftness or slowness of it, or its direction to the north or 
south, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner 
of man, or of a beast; but walking gracefully implies a manner of 
mode superadded to that action. All comparative and superlative 
degrees of any quality, are the modes of a mode, as swifter implies 
a greater measure of swiftness. 

It would he too tedious here to run through all the modes, ac¬ 
cidents, and relations at large that belong to various beings, and 
are copiously treated of in general in the science called metaphy¬ 
sics, or more properly ontology ; they are also treated of in parti¬ 
cular in those sciences which have assumed them severally as 
their proper subjects. 


BOOK I. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


H6 


SECTION IV. 

Of Not Being. 

As being is divided into substance and mode, so we may con¬ 
sider not-being with regard to both these. 

I. Not-being is considered as excluding all substance, and then 
all modes are also necessarily excluded, and this we call pure 
nullity, or mere nothing. 

This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philosophical sense; 
so we say there is nothing in the cup, in the vulgar sense, when 
we mean there is no liquor in it; but we cannot say there is no¬ 
thing in the cup, in a strict philosophical sense, while there is air 
in it, and perhaps a million of rays of light are there* 

II. Not-being, as it has relation to modes or manners of being, 
may be considered either as a mere negation, or as a privation. 

A negation is the absence of that which does not naturally be¬ 
long to the thing we are speaking of, or which has no right, obli¬ 
gation, or necessity to be present with it: as when we say a stone 
is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, it has no life, nor sight, nor 
hearing; }(or when we say a carpenter ora fisherman is unlearn¬ 
ed, these are mere negations. 

But a privation is the absence of what does naturally belong to 
the thing we are speaking of, or which ought to be present with 
i t, as w hen a man ora horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a phy¬ 
sician or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations; so 
the sinfulness of any human action is said to be a privation ; for 
sin is that want of conformity to the law of God, which ought 
to be found in every action of man. 

CHAPTER III. 

Of the several sorts of Perceptions or Ideas. 

IDEAS are divided with regard to their original, their nature, 
and their objects. 

Ideas with respect to their original, are sensible, intellectual, or 
abstracted. 

Sensible, or corporeal ideas, are those which are derived origi¬ 
nally from our own senses; such are the notions we frame of all 
colours,sounds, tastes, figures, and motions. All the ideas which 
we have of body, and the sensible modes and properties that be¬ 
long to it, are derived from this source, sensation. 


1 6 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK 1. 


Intellectual ideas are those which we gain by reflecting on the 
nature and actions of our own mind. Such are our ideas of 
thought, assent, dissent, reason, knowledge, love, fear, hope, &c. 
By sensation, the mind contemplates, as it were, things out of 
itself, and gains corporeal representations or sensible ideas; by 
reflection, the mind contemplates itself, and things within itself, 
and by these means obtains its intellectual notions. 

Abstracted ideas are so called, because, though the original 
ground or occasion of them may be sensation or reflection, yet 
these ideas are more immediately framed by that act of the mind 
which we term abstraction. This is the act or faculty of with¬ 
drawing some parts of an idea from other parts, and confining the 
attention of the mind to such parts by themselves. And such ab¬ 
stractions are chiefly of two kinds; namely absolute abstractions, 
which are our general and universal conceptions of things consi¬ 
dered only in themselves; (such as entity, essence, existence, act, 
power, substance, &c.) and relative abstractions, such as causeand 
effect, likeness and unlikeness, subject, object, order, &c. in which 
we confine our attention to the relations, and entirely pass over 
the subjects in which they are as it were incorporated. 

Ideas, considered in their nature, are either simple or complex. 

A simple idea is one which does not admit of any division, or 
which cannot be separated by the mind into two or more ideas. 
Such are the ideas of sweet, bitter, cold, heat, white, red, hard, soft 
motion, rest, thought, will, wish, &c. 

A complex idea is one which is composed of two or more 
simple ideas together, such as a square, a triangle, a table, reading, 
writing, body, a man, &c. 

There are two other terms which fall under this head, of the 
nature of ideas; i. e. a collective and a compound idea. 

A collective idea is one which is composed of many ideas of the 
same kind joined together,—such as an army, a parliaments 
flock, a grove, a forest. 

A compound idea is one which is composed of things of a dif¬ 
ferent kind, such as harmony,—-virtue, &c. 

Ideas, according to their objects, are particular or universal. 

A particular idea is that of which the object is one thing 
only, or an individual. If this object or individual be general 
and indeterminate, such as when we say a man, or a horse, it is 
termed an Individuum Vagum. If the individual be ascertained, 
as when we say Bucephalus, Cicero, John, &c. orthe man and 
the horse, the particular idea is termed a singular idea. 


BOOK 1. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, 


17 


A Universal idea is that of which the object is a rank of beings, 
or a common nature agreeing to several things—So a horse, a man, 
or a book, are called universal ideas, because they agree to all 
horses, all men, or all books. 

A Universal idea is either general or special. 

General idea is that of which the object is a genus. 

A Special idea is that of which the object is a species, 


CHAPTER IV. 


Of Words and their Divisions , 

WORDS are the signs or indices, by which we express orcon- 
vey our ideas to each other. 

But words, whether spoken or written, have no natural con¬ 
nexion either with the ideas they are employed to signify, nor 
with the things which are the objects of those ideas. Thus there 
is no manner of relation between the sounds white, black, &c. and 
the colours which we intend to convey by those names. Words 
therefore, are mere arbitrary names, invented by men to com¬ 
municate their thoughts to each other. 

One or more words, employed to express an idea or simple 
perception, is called a term. 

Terms are either positive or negative. 

Positive terms are those which imply the presence of any being 
or substance,—such as life, knowledge, &c. 

Negative terms are those, which imply the absence of any being, 
or mode of being, such as blindness, darkness, madness, death, &c. 

Terms are likewise divided into simple and complex. A simple 
term is one word. A complex term is when more words are 
used to signify one thing or idea. 

Some terms are complex in words, but not in sense; such as 
the second emperor of Rome, for it excites in our mind only the 
idea of one man, Augustus. 

Some terms are complex in sense, but not in words, as an army, 
a forest, &c. Again some terms are complex both in words and 
sense, as a tierce dog, &c. 

Words or names are likewise common or proper. 

Common names are those, of which the subject is a universal 
idea, or a rank of beings, whether general or special. These are 
called appellatives, thus fish, bird, man, city, trout, eel, &c. 

No. l. p 


BOOK I, 


IS ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

Proper names are those, of which the subject is a single being; 
such as Cicero, Virgil, &c. 

Words or terms are likewise abstract or concrete. 

Abstract terms are those, which signify the mode or quality of 
a being, without any regard to the subject in which it exists; as 
whiteness, roundness, length, breadth, &c. 

Concrete terms are those which both express the quality and 
the subject to which it belongs, as white, round, long, broad, &c. 

Words are moreover univocal or equivocal. 

Univocal words are those which only signify one thing or idea, 
and are never applied to any other, as the words, book, bible, fish 
house, &C. 

Equivocal words are those, which are applied to signify two 
or more different kind of things or ideas, so as to cause an am¬ 
biguity which is intended. Thus the word head is an equivocal 
word, as signifying the head of a nail or of an animal, and post, 
which is a piece of timber, or a swift messenger. In the same 
manner all kind of puns, and all figurative and tropical terms. 

CHAPTER V. 

Of Definition and Division . 

AS words are signs of things or ideas, and as we see they may 
|be univocal or equivocal, it becomes necessary to explain the 
sense in which we use them ; that is to say, to define them, when 
they are obscure, or distribute them into their several significations 
where ambiguous. 

Definition of a word or name is the declaration in what sense 
the word is used, or what idea or object we intend by it. It is 
made either by a more known word, or by the etymology. A 
synonymous word, a mere negation of the contrary, a translation 
of the word into another language, or a grammatical explication 
of it, are indifferently used for such definition. As if any one 
should require what I mean by a sphere, I might reply a globe; 
dark, that which is not light • oval, what has the shape of an egg, 
&c. 

Definition of a thing is the declaration of its nature. It is made 
by its genus, by its difference, by its properties, and occasionally 
by the enumeration of its accidents. 

Three acts of the mind are employed in forming a definition* 


tSOOK I. 


Elements of logic, 


19 


First, we compare the thing to be defined with other things 
that are most like to itself, and see wherein its essence or nature 
agrees with them ; and this is called the general nature or genus 
in a definition : so if you would define what wine is, first compare 
it with other things like itself, as cyder, perry, &c. and you will 
find it agrees essentially with them in this, that it is a sort of 
juice. 

Secondly, we consider the most remarkable and primary attri¬ 
bute, property, or idea wherein this thing differs from those other 
things that are most like it; and that is its essential or specific 
difference: so wine dilfers from cyder and perry, and all other 
juices, in that it is pressed from a grape. This may be called 
its special nature, which distinguishes it from other juices. 

Thirdly, we join the general and special nature together, (or 
which is all one), the genus and the difference, and these make up 
a definition. So the juice of a grape, or juice pressedjrom grapes, 
is the definition of wine. 

So if I would define what winter is, I consider first wherein it 
agrees with other things which are most like it, (viz.) summer, 
spring, autumn, and I find they are all seasons of the year ; there¬ 
fore a season of the year is the genus. Then I observe wherein 
it differs from these, and that is in the shortness of tike days; for 
it is this which does primarily distinguish it from other seasons; 
therefore this may be called its special nature of its difference. 
Then by joining these together I make a definition; Winter is 
that season of the year wherein the days are shortest* I confess, 
indeed, this is but a rude definition of it; for to define it, as an 
accurate astronomer, I must limit the days, hours, and minutes. 

After the same manner, if we would explain or define what the 
picture of man is, we consider first the genus, or general nature of 
it, which is a representation; and herein it agrees with many 
other things, as a statue, a shadow, a print, a verbal description 
of a man, &c. Then we consider wherein it differs from these, 
and we find it differs from a verbal description, in that it is a repre¬ 
sentation to the eye, and not to the ear: it differs from a statue, in 
that it is a represention upon a flat surface, and notina solid figure: 
it differs from a shadow in that it is an abiding representation and 
not a fleeting one: it differs from a print or draught, because it 
represents the colours by paint as well as the shape of the object 
by delineation. Now, so many, or rather so few, of these ideas 
put together, as are just sufficient to distinguish a picture from all 
other representations, make up its essential difference, or its spe¬ 
cial nature ; and all these are included in its being painted on a 


20 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK I. 


plain surface. Then join this to the genus, which is a represent¬ 
ation; and thus you have the complete definition of the picture, 
of a man, (viz.) it is the representation^ a man in paint upon a sur¬ 
face (or a plane.) 

The next general nature, or the nearest genus, must be used in 
a definition, because it includes all the rest; and if I would de¬ 
fine wine, I must say wine is a juice, which is the nearest genus ; 
and not say, wine is a liquid, which is a remote general nature; 
or wine is a substance which is yet more remote, for juice in¬ 
cludes both substance and liquid. Besides, neither of these two 
remote general natures would make any distinction between wine 
and a thousand other substances or other liquids, a remote genus 
leaves the thing too much undistinguished. 

The specific difference is that primary attribute which distin¬ 
guishes each species from one another, while they stand ranked 
under the same general nature or genus. Though wine differs 
from other liquids in that it is the juice of a certain fruit, yet this 
is but a general or generic difference, for it does not distinguish 
wine from cyder or perry; the specific difference of wine there¬ 
fore is its pressure from the grape; as cyder is pressed from apples, 
and perry from pears. 

The special rules of a good definition are these: 

I. A definition must be adequate; that is, it must agree to 
all the particular species or individuals that are included under 
the same idea; so the juice of a grape agrees to all proper wines 
whether red, white, French, Spanish, Florence, &c. 

II. It must be proper and peculiar to the thing defined, and 
agree to that alone; for it is the very design of a definition effec¬ 
tually to distinguish one thing from all others: so the juice of a 
grape agrees to no other substance, to no other liquid, to no other 
being but wine. 

III. A definition must be clearer than the word or thing 
defined. 

Hence it will follow also, that there are many things which 
cannot well be defined, either as to the name of the thing, unless it 
be by synonymous words, or by a negation of the contrary idea, 
&c. for they cannot be made more evident or more intelligible, 
than the ideas which every man has gained by the vulgar methods 
of teaching. Such are the ideas of extension, duration, thought, 
consciousness, and most of our simple ideas, and particularly sen¬ 
sible qualities, as white, blue, red, cold, beat, sweet, bitter, 
sour, &c. 


b'OOic r. ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 2i 

The division of a thing is the distribution of a whole into its 
parts. 

Logicians enumerate four kinds of whole. 

1. There is a metaphysical whole, when the essence of a thing 
is said to consist of two parts, the genus and the difference, i. e. the 
general and the special nature, which being joined together make 
up a definition. 

2. There is a mathematical whole, which is better called an in¬ 
tegral, when the several parts, which go to make up the whole, are 
really distinct from one another, and each of them may subsist 
apart. So the head, the limbs and the trunk, are the integral 
parts of an animal body ; so units are the integral parts of any large 
number. 

3. There is a physical or essential whole, which includes all the 
essential modes, attributes, or properties, which are contained in 
the comprehension of any idea. 

4. There is a logical whole, which is also called an universal; 
and the parts of it are all the particular ideas to which this uni¬ 
versal nature extends. So a genus is a whole in respect of the 
several species which are its parts. So the species is a whole, and 
all the individuals are the parts of it. 

The special rules of a good division are these : 

I. Each part singly taken must contain less than the whole, but 
all the parts taken collectively (or together) must contain neither 
more nor less than the whole. Therefore, in discoursing of a tree, 
if you divide it into the trunk and leaves, it is an imperfect divi¬ 
sion, because the root and the branches are needful to make up 
the whole. 

II. The several parts of a division ought to be opposite, i. e. one 
part ought not to contain another. It would be a ridiculous di¬ 
vision of an animal into head, limbs, body, and brain, for the brains 
are contained in the head. 


TUt 

ELEMENTS OF LOGIC* 


BOOK II. 

OF JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION. 


CHAPTER L 

Of the nature and several parts of the Proposition, 

THE mind, acting by its second faculty, Judgment, compart 
two ideas together, and thence perceives their agreement or dis¬ 
agreement. The result of this judgment, expressed in words, i? 
a sentence, or proposition, in which such agreement is affirmed or 
denied. 

A Proposition , therefore, is a sentence, in which something is 
affirmed or denied of some other thing or person. As, “A man is 
an animal”, 

There are three thiRgs which go to the nature and constitu¬ 
tion of a proposition, namely; the subject, the predicate, and the 
copula. 

The Subject of a proposition is that concerning which any 
thing is affirmed or denied. Thus man is the subject of the 
proposition,“ Man is an animal.” 

The Predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the sub-' 
ject; so “Animal,” is the predicate of the proposition above 
given. 

The Copula is that which connects the subject and predicate. 
It is expressed by the words am, art, is, &c. 

The subject and predicate of a proposition, taken together, are 
called the Matter of it, being the materials of which it is made. 

The Copula is termed the Form of a proposition. 

If each of these parts of a proposition be not expressed distinctly 
in so many words, yet they are all understood, and implicitly 
contained therein ; as “ Socrates disputed,” is a complete proposi- 






BOOK It. 


ELEMENTS OF LGGIC. 


23 


tion, for it signifies Socrates was disputing. So I die, signifies I 
am dying. I can write, i. e. I am able to write. In Latin and 
.Greek one single word is many times a complete proposition. 

These words, am, art, is, &c. when they are used alone without 
any other predicate, signify both the act of the mind judging, 
which includes the copula, and signify also actual existence, 
which is the predicate of that proposition. So Rome is, signifies 
Rome is existent; there are some strange monsters, that is, some 
strange monsters are existent: Carthage is no more, i. e. Carthage 
has no being. 

The subject and predicate of a proposition are not always to be 
known and distinguished by the placing of the words in the sen¬ 
tence, but by reflecting duly on the sense of the words, and on 
the mind and design of the speaker or writer: as if I say, in 
Africa there are many lions, I mean many lions are existent in 
Africa; many lions is the subject, and existent in Africa is the 
predicate. It is proper for a philosopher to understand geometry; 
here the word proper is the predicate, and all the rest is the sub¬ 
ject, except is, the copula. 

The subject and predicate of a proposition ought always to be 
two different ideas, or two different terms ; for where both the 
terms and ideas are the same, it is called an identical proposition, 
which is mere trifling, and cannot tend to promote knowledge; 
such as, “ A rule is a rule, or a good man is a good man.” 

But there are some propositions, wherein the terms of the sub¬ 
ject and predicate seem to be the same; yet the ideas are not the 
same ; nor can these be called purely identical, or trifling pro¬ 
positions; such as Socrates is Socrates still; that is, the man 
Socrates is still a philosopher: the hero was not a hero; that is, 
the hero did not shew his courage : what I have written, I have 
written ; that is, what I wrote I still approve, and will not alter 
it: what is dbne is done; that is, it cannot be undone. It may 
be easily observed in these propositions the term is equivocal, 
for in the predicate it has a different idea from what it has in 
the subject. 

There are also some propositions wherein the terms of the 
subject and predicate differ, but the ideas are the same; and 
these are not merely identical or trifling propositions; as impu¬ 
dent is shameless; a billow is a wave ; or fluctus (in Latin) is a 
wave; a globe is a round body. In these propositions, either the 
words are explained by a definition of the name, or the ideas by 


24 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC; 


BOOK IT* 


a definition of the things, and therefore they are by no means 
useless when formed for any purpose. 


CHAPTER II. 

Of the various kinds of Propositions. 

PROPOSITIONS are divided according to their substance , 
their quantity , quality , their composition, and their evidence. 

Propositions, according to their substance, are categorical (i. e, 
simple) or Conditional. A categorical proposition is one, in which 
something is simply and absolutely affirmed or denied of another* 
As “ a man is an animal.” 

A Conditional proposition is, where this affirmation or negation 
is qualified by some condition, or mode. 

Propositions, according to their quantity , are universal , par¬ 
ticular , indefinite , or singular . 

A Universal proposition is where the subject is taken according 
to its whole extension; so if the subject be a genus, it includes 
all its species; if a species, all its individuals, as “ all men must 
die.” 

A Particular proposition is where the subject is not taken 
according to its whole extension, but is limited or restrained to 
some one or more of its species or individuals, as “ Some birds 
will sing.” 

A Singular proposition is where the subject is a singular or indi¬ 
vidual term or idea ; as “ Newton was the first of philosophers.” 
But as this subject must be taken according to its whole exten¬ 
sion, (because being an individual it can extend only to one,) a 
singular proposition is necessarily a universal. 

An Indefinite proposition is where no note either of univer¬ 
sality or particularity is prefixed to a proposition, which is in its 
own nature general, as, a planet always moves, angels are superior 
creatures. Now this sort of proposition, especially when it de¬ 
scribes the nature of things, is regarded as a universal, and sup¬ 
poses the subject to be taken in its whole extension. 

A Universal Term is sometimes taken either collectively % forall 
particular ideas united together, or sometimes distributed y , 
signifying each of them single and alone. Thus, “All these 
apples will fill a bushel,” is a Collective Universal. In which 
propositions, it is evident that the predicate belongs not to the 


BOOK IT. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


25 


individuals separately, but to the whole collective idea; for 
we cannot change the word all into every one, and say every apple 
will fill a bushel. 

A Distributive Universal will allow the word all to be changed 
into every one, and is thus distinguished from a collective,—Thus, 
“ All men are mortal/' signifies “ every man is mortal.” 

Propositions, according to their Quality , are Negative or 
Affirmative . 

An Affirmative Proposition is where the predicate is affirmed 
of the subject, being joined to it by the words “ is or are” expressed 
or implied—“All men are mortal.” 

A Negative Proposition is where the predicate is denied of 
the subject, being disjoined by the particles “ is not, are not,” ex¬ 
pressed or implicitly contained in the verb, “Man is not free 
from sin.” 

In an Affirmative Proposition we assert one thing to belong to 
another, and unite them in word and thought. In a Negative 
Proposition, we separate one thing from another, and deny their 
agreement. 


SECTION I. 

Of the Opposition and Conversion of Propositions. 

Any two ideas being joined or disjoined in various forms will 
afford us several propositions: all these may be distinguished ac¬ 
cording to their quantity and their quality* into four, which are 
marked or denoted by the letters A E, I, O, thus: 

A \ r Universal affirmative 

Ef NUniversal negative 

I i denotes a \ Particular affirmative 

O ) ( Particular negative 

according to these old Latin rhymes 

Asserit A , negat E, verum generaliter ambce ; 

Asserit /, negat O, sed particulariter amho. 

This may be exemplified by these two ideas, a vine and a tree. 

A every vine is a tree. 

E No vine is a tree. 

I Some vine is a tree. 

O Some vine is not a tree. 

* T l, e reader should remember here, that a proposition according to its quantity 
is called universal or particular, and according to its quality is either affirmative 
or negative. 

No. I. D 



25 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, 


BOOK If. 


The logicians of the schools have written many large trifles 
concerning the opposition and conversion of propositions. It will 
be sufficient here to give a few brief hints of these things, that 
the learner may not be utterly ignorant of them. 

Propositions which are made of the same subject and predicate 
are said to be opposite, when that which is denied in one is 
affirmed iiv the other* either in whole or in part, without any con¬ 
sideration whether the propositions be true or no. 


If they differ both in quantity and quality, they are said to be 
contradictory ; as, 

A Every vine is a tree, I These can never be both true, 

O Some vine is not a tree. lor both false at the same time. 


If two universals differ in 

A Every vine is a tree. 

E No vine is a tree. 


quality, they are contraries; as, 

v These can never be both tru^ 
< together, but they may be 
) both* false. 


If two particular propositions differ in quality, they are 
subcontraries. 

I Some vine is a tree, { These may be both true together, 

O Some vine is not a tree, c but they can never be both false. 

Both particular and universal propositions, which agree in 
quality but not in quantity, are called subaltern, though these are 
not properly opposite, as, 

A Every vine is a-tree, 

I Some vine is a tree.' 

Or thus : 

E No vine is a tree. 

O Some vine is not a tree. 

The canons of subaltern propositions are usually reckoned 
these three, viz. (1.) if any universal proposition be true, the par¬ 
ticular will be true also, but not on the contrary. And (2.) If a 
particular proposition be false, the universal must be false, but 
not on the contrary. (3) Subaltern propositions, whether univer¬ 
sal or particular, may sometimes be both true, and sometimes both 
false. 

The conversion of propositions is when the subject and predi¬ 
cate change their places with preservation of their truth. This 
may be done with constant certainty in all universal negatives 
and particular affirmatives; as, no spirit is an animal, may be con¬ 
verted, no animal is a spirit; and some tree is a vine, may be con¬ 
verted, some vine is a tree. But there is more formal trifling in 


BOOK 11. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


2? 


.this sort of discourse than there is of solid improvement, because 
this sort of conversion arises merely from the form of words, as 
connected in a proposition, rather than from the matter. 

Yet it may be useful to observe, that there are some pro¬ 
positions, which, by reason of the ideas .or matter of which they 
are composed, may be converted with constant truth; such as 
those propositions whose predicate is a nominal or real definition 
of the subject, or the difference of it, or a property of the fourth 
kind, or a superlative degree of any property or quality what¬ 
soever, or, in short, wheresoever the predicate and the subject 
have exactly the same extension or the same comprehension: as, 
every vine is a tree bearing grapes; and every tree bearing grapes 
is a vine: religion is the truest wisdom, and the 1afc»truest wisdom 
is religion: Julius Caesar was the first emperor of Rome ; and the 
iirst emperor of Rome was Julius Caesar. These are the pro. 
positions which are properly convertible, and they are called re? 
eiprocal propositions. 


SECTION II. 

Of pure and modal Propositions . 

Another division of propositions is into pure and modal. This 
may be called (for distinction sake) a division according to the 
predicate. 

When a proposition merely expresses that the predicate is con? 
nected with the subject, it is called a pure proposition ; as, every 
true Christian is an honest man. But when it includes also the 
way and manner wherein the predicate is connected with the 
subject, it is called a modal proposition; as, when I say, it is 
necessary that a true Christian should be an honest man. 

Logical writers generally make the modality of this proposition 
to belong to the copula, because it shews the manner of the con¬ 
nection between subject and predicate. But if the form of the 
sentence, as a logical proposition, be duly considered, the mode 
itself is the very predicate of the proposition, and it must run 
thus: that a true Christian should be an honest man is a necessary 
thing, and then the whole primary proposition is included in the 
subject of the modal proposition. 

There are four modes of connecting the predicate with the sub¬ 
ject, which are usually reckoned up on this occasion, (viz.) neces¬ 
sity and contingency, which are two opposites, possibility and. 





28 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK II. 


impossibility which are also two opposites ; as it is necessary that 
a globe should be round, that a globe be made of wood or glass is 
an unnecessary or contingent thing: it is impossible that a globe 
should be square: it is impossible that a globe should be of 
water. 

There are several other modes of speaking whereby a predicate 
is connected with a subject: such as, it is certain, it is doubtful, 
it is probable, it is improbable, it is agreed, it is granted, it is 
said by the ancients, it is written, &c. all which will form other 
kinds of modal propositions. 

But whether the modality be natural, moral, &c. yet in all 
these propositions it is the mode is the proper predicate, and all 
the rest of the propositions, except the copula (or word is) belongs 
to the subject; and thus they become pure propositions of a com* 
plex nature, of which we shall treat in the next section, so that 
there is no great need of making modals a distinct sort. 

SECTION III. 

Of Single Propositions , whether simple or complex. 

Wheri we consider the nature of propositions, together with 
the formation of them and the materials whereof they are made, 
we divide them into single and compound. 

A single proposition is that which has but one subject and one 
predicate; but if it has more subjects or more predicates, it is 
called a compound proposition, and it contains t>vo or more pro?* 
positions in it. 

A single proposition (which is also called categorical) may be 
divided again into simple and complex. 

A purely simple proposition is that whose subject and predi¬ 
cate are made up of single terms : as virtue is desirable: every 
penitent is pardoned ; no man is innocent. 

When the subject or predicate, or both, are made up of com¬ 
plex terms, it is called a complex proposition; as every sincere 
penitent is pardoned ; virtue is desirable for its own sake ; no 
man alive is perfectly innocent. 

If the term which is added to the subject of a complex pro¬ 
position be either essential or any way necessary to it, then it is 
called explicative, for itonly explains the subject; as every mortal! 
man is a son of Adam. But if the term added to make up the 
complex subject does not necessarily or constantly belong to it, 



BOOK II. 


29 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

then it is determinative, and limits the subject to a particular 
part of its extension; as every pious man shall be happy. In the 
first proposition the word mortal is merely explicative; in the 
second proposition the word pious is determinative. 

In a complex proposition, the predicate or subject is sometimes 
made complex by the pronouns who, which, whose, to whom, &c. 
which make another proposition; as every man who is pious 
shall be saved: Julius, whosesirname was Caesar, overcame Pom- 
pey: bodies, which are transparent, have many pores. Here the 
whole proposition is called the primary or chief, and the additional 
proposition is called an incident proposition. But it is still to be 
esteemed in this case merely as a part of the complex term ; and 
the truth or falsehood of the whole complex proposition is not to 
be judged by the truth or falsehood of the incident proposition, 
but by the connection of the whole subject with the predicate. 
For the incident proposition may be false, and absurd, or impos¬ 
sible, and yet the whole complex proposition may be true, as a 
horse which has wings might flyover the Thames. 

Beside this complection which belongs to the subject or predi¬ 
cate, logical writers use to say, there is a complection which may 
fall upon the copula also: but this 1 have accounted for in the 
section concerning modal propositions; and indeed it is not of 
much importance whether it be placed there or here. 


SECTION IV. 

Of Compound Propositions f 

A compound proposition is made up of two or more subjects or 
predicates, or both; and it contains in it two or more propositions, 
which are either plainly expressed, or concealed and implied. 

The first sort of compound propositions are those wherein the 
compositions is expressed and evident, and they are distinguished 
into these six kinds, (viz.) copulative, disjunctive, conditional, 
causal, relative, and discretive. 

I. Copulative propositions are those which have more subjects 
or predicates connected by affirmative or negative conjunctions: 
as, Riches and honours are temptations to pride: Caesar conquered 
the Gauls and the Britons; Neither gold nor jewels will pur¬ 
chase immortality. These propositions are evidently compounded, 
for each of them may be resolved into two propositions, (viz.) 
Riches are temptations to pride; and honour is a temptation to 
pride; and so the rest. 



30 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK II. 


The truth of copulative propositions depends upon the 1 ruth 
of all the parts of them; for if Caesar had conquered the Gauls 
and not the Britons, or the Britons and not the Gauls, the second 
copulative proposition had not been true. 

Here note, those propositions which cannot be resolved into two 
or more simple propositions, are not properly copulative, though 
two pr more ideas be connected and coupled by such conjunctions^ 
either in the subject or predicate; as, two and three make five; 
majesty and meekness do not often meet; the sun, moon, and 
stars are not all seen at once. Such propositions are to be esteemed 
merely complex, because the predicate cannot be affirmed of each 
single subject, but only of all of them together as a collective 
subject. 

II. Disjunctive propositions are when the parts ire disjoined 
or opposed to one another by disjunctive particles: as, it is either 
day or night: the weather is either shining or rainy; quantity is 
either length, breadth,or depth. 

The truthof disjuctives depends on the necessary and immediate 
opposition of the parts; therefore only the last of these examples 
is true; but the two first are not strictly true, because twilight is 
a medium between day and night; and dry cloudy weather is a 
medium between shining and rainy. 

III. Conditional or hypothetical propositions are those whose 
parts are united by the conditional particle, if; as, if the sun be 
fixed, the earth must move: If there be no fire, there will be no 
smoke. 

Note, the first part of these propositions, or that wherein the 
condition is contained, is called the antecedent, the other is called 
the consequent. 

The truth of these propositions depends not at all on the truth 
and falsehood of their two parts, but on the truth of the connec¬ 
tion of them; for each part of them may be fa|se, and yet the 
whole proposition true; as, if there be no providence, there will 
be no future judgment. 

IV. Casual propositions are where two propositions are joined 
by causal particles: as. Houses were not built that they might be 
destroyed: Rehoboam was unhappy because he followed evil 
counsel. 

The truth of a casual proposition arises not from the truth of 
the parts, but from the causal influence that the one part of it ha$ 
upon the other; for both parts may be true, yet the proposition 
false, if one part be not the cause of the other. 

cl 11 4 a f 




feOOK II. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC: 


31 


Some logicians refer reduplicative propositions to this place: 
as, men, considered as men, are rational creatures, i. e. because 
they are men. 

V. Relative propositions have their parts joined by such parti¬ 
cles as express a relation or comparison of one thing to another; 
as, when you are silent I will speak: as much as you are worth, 
so much you shall be esteemed: as is the father so is the son: 
where there is no tale-bearer* contention will cease. 

These very much resemble conditional propositions, and the 
truth of them depends upon the justness of their connection* 

VI. Decretive propositions are such wherein various and seem¬ 
ingly opposite judgments are made, whose variety or distinction 
is noted by the particles but, though, yet, &c. as. Travellers may 
change their climate, but not their temper: Job was patient, though 
his grief was great. 

The truth and goodness of a discretive proposition depends on 
the truth of both parts, and their contradiction to one another; 
for though both parts should be true, yet if there be no seeming 
opposition between them, it is an useless assertion, though we 
cannot call it a false one ; as, Descartes was a philosopher, yet he 
was a Frenchman: the Romans were valiant, but they spoke La¬ 
tin. Both which propositions are ridiculous for want of a seem* 
ing opposition between the parts. 

Since we have declared wherein the truth and falsehood of these 
Compound propositions consist, it is proper also to give some in¬ 
timations, how any of these propositions* when they are false, may 
be opposed or contradicted. 

All compound propositions, except copulatives and discretives* 
are properly denied or contradicted, when the negation affects 
their conjunctive particles; as if the conjunctive proposition 
asserts, It is either day or night, the opponent say9, It is not 
either day or night: or it is not necessary that it should be either 
day or night, so the hypothetical proposition is denied by saying. 
It does not follow that the earth must move if the sun be fixed. 

A disconjunctive proposition may he contradicted also by deny¬ 
ing all the parts; as, it is neither day nor night. 

And a casual proposition may be denied or opposed indirectly or 
improperly, when either part of the proposition is denied ; and it 
must be false if either part be false; but the design of the pro¬ 
position being to shew the ca sua l connexion of the two parts, each 
part is supposed to be true, and it is not properly contradicted as 

/* ct i L } 


32 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. book ir. 

pt 7 / L 

a casual proposition, unless one part ofitbe denied to be the cause 
of the other. 

As for copulatives and discretives, because their truth depends 
more on the truth of their parts, therefore these may be opposed 
or denied as many ways as the parts of which they are composed 
may he denied; so this copulative proposition, Riches and honour 
are temptations to pride, may he denied by saying, Riches are not 
temptations, though honour may he; or, Honour is not a tempta¬ 
tion, though riches maybe; or, Neither riches nor honour are 
temptations, &c. 

So this decretive proposition, Job was patient, though his grief 
was great, is denied by saying, Job was not patient, though his 
grief was great; or, Job was patient, but his grief was not great; 
or, Job was not patient, nor was his grief great. 

We proceed now to the second sort of compound propositions, 
viz. such whose composition is not expressed, but latent or con¬ 
cealed, yet a small attention will find two propositions included 
in them. Such are these that follow. 

1. Exclusives; as, The pious man alone is happy : It fs only 
Sir Isaac Newton could find out true philosophy. 

2. Exceptives; as, None of the ancients but Plato well de¬ 
fended the souPs immortality: The protestants worship none 
but God. 

3. Comparatives; as, Pain is the greatest affliction: No Turk 
was fiercer than the Spaniards at Mexico. 

Here note, that the comparative degree does not always imply 
the positive: as if I say, a fool is better than a knave, this does 
not affirm that folly is good, but that it is a less evil than knavery. 

4. Inceptives and desitives, which relate to the beginning or 
ending of any thing: as, the Latin tongue is not yet forgotten. 
No man before Orpheus wrote Greek verse. Peter Czar, of Mus¬ 
covy, began to civilize his nation. 

To these may be added continuatives; as, Rome remains to 
this day, which includes at leasttwo propositions, viz. Rome was, 
and Rome is. 


SECTION V. 

Propositions according to their Evidence. 

Propositions are next considered according to their sense or sig¬ 
nification, and thus they are distributed into true or false. A true 



BOOK IT* 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


33 


proposition represents things as they are in themselves: but if 
things are represented otherwise than, they are in themselves, the 
proposition is false. 

Again, propositions, according to their different degrees of evi¬ 
dence, are distinguished into certain and dubious. 

Where the evidence of the agreement or disagreement of the 
ideas is so strong and plain, that we cannot forbid or delay our 
assent, the proposition is called certain; as, every circle hath a 
centre; the world did not create itself. An assent to such pro¬ 
positions is honoured with the name of knowledge. 

But when there is any obscurity upon the agreement or dis¬ 
agreement of the ideas, so that the mind does not clearly perceive 
it, and is not compelled to assent or dissent, then the proposition* 
in a proper and philosophical sense, is called doubtful or uncer¬ 
tain ; as, the planets are inhabited ; the souls of brutes are mere 
matter; the world will not stand a thousand years longer; Dido 
built the city of Carthage, &c. Such uncertain propositions are 
called opinions. 

Certainty, according to the schools, is distinguished intoobjec- 
tive and subjective. Objective certainty is when the proposition 
is certainly true in itself ; and subjective, when we are certain of 
the truth of it. The one is in things, the other is in our minds. 

But let it be observed here, that every proposition in itself is 
certainly true, or certainly false. For though doubtfulness or 
uncertainty seems to be a medium between certain truth and cer¬ 
tain falsehood in our minds, yet there is no such medium in things 
themselves, no, not even in future events : for now at this time it 
is certain in itself, that Midsummer-day seven years hence will be 
serene, or it is certain it will be cloudy, though we are uncertain 
and utterly ignorant what sort of day it will be: this certainty of 
distant futurity is know n to God only. 

Uncertain or dubious propositions, i. e. opinions, are distin¬ 
guished into probable or improbable. 

When the evidence of any proposition is greater than the evi¬ 
dence of the contrary, then it is a probable opinion: where the 
evidence and arguments are stronger on the contrary side, we call 
it improbable. But while the arguments on either side seem to be 
equally strong, and the evidence for and against any proposition 
appears equal to the mind, then in common language we call it a 
doubtful matter. We also call it a dubious or doubtful proposition 
when there is no argument on either side, as next Christmas-day 
will be a very sharp frost. And in general all these propositions 
are doubtful wherein we can perceive no sufficient marks or evi- 
No. I. E 



34 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK II. 


dence of truth or falsehood. In such a case, the mind which is 
searching for truth ought to remain in a state of doubt or suspense, 
until superior evidence on one side or the other incline the balance 
of the judgment, and determine the probability or certainty to the 
one side. 

A great many propositions which we generally believe or dis- 
belive in human affairs, or in the sciences, have very various 
degrees of evidence, which yet arise not to complete certainty, 
either of truth or falsehood. Thus it comes to pass that there 
are such various and almost infinite degiees of probability and 
improbability. To a weak probability we should give a weak 
assent; and a stronger assent is due where the evidence is greater, 
and the matter more probable. If we proportion our assent in all 
things to the degrees of evidence, we do the utmost that human 
nature is capable of in a rational way to secure itself from error. 


THE 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

BOOK IIL 

OF REASON AND SYLLOGISM. 


AS the first work of the mind i9 perception, whereby our 
ideas are framed, and the second is judgment, which joins or dis¬ 
joins our ideas, and forms a proposition ; so the third operation of 
the mind is reasoning, which joins several propositions together, 
and makes a syllogism, that is, an argument whereby we are wont 
to infer some things that are less known, from truths which are 
more evident. 

In treating of this subject, let us consider more particularly, 

1. The nature of a syllogism, and the parts of which it is 
composed. 

2. The several kinds of syllogisms, with particular rules relating 
to them. 

3. The doctrine of syllogisms, of false reasoning, together with 
the means of avoiding them, and the manner of solving or an-* 
swering them. 


CHAPTER I. 

Of the nature of a Syllogism , and the parts of which it is composed . 

IF the mere perception and comparison of two ideas would 
shew us whether they agree or disagree, then all rational proposi¬ 
tions would be matters of intelligence, or first principles, and there 
would be no use of reasoning, or drawing any consequences. It 
is the narrowness of the human mind which introduces the ne¬ 
cessity of reasoning. When we are unable to judge of the truth 






36 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK II?* 


or falsehood of a proposition in an immediate manner, by the mere 
contemplation of its subject and predicate, we are thus constrained 
to use a medium, and to compare each of them with some third 
idea, that by seeing how far they agree or disagree with it, we 
may be able to judge how far they agree or disagree among them¬ 
selves : as, if there are two lines A and B, and I know not whe¬ 
ther ihev are equal or no, I take a third line C, or an inch, and 
apply it to each of them ; if it agree with them both, then I infer 
that A and B are equal; but if it agree with one and not with 
the other, then I conclude A and B are unequal; if it agree with 
neither of them, there can be no comparison. 

So if the question be, whether God must be worshipped, wq 
seek a third idea, suppose the idea of a creator, and say. 

Our Creator must be worshipped. 

God is our Creator. 

Therefore God must be worshipped. 

The comparison of this third idea, with the two distinct parts 
of the question, usually requires two propositions, which are 
called the premises: the third proposition, which is drawn from 
them, is the conclusion, wherein the question itself is answered, 
and the subject and predicate joined either in the negative or the 
affirmative. 

The foundation of all affirmative conclusions is laid in this ge¬ 
neral truth, that so far as two proposed ideas agree to any third 
idea, they agree also among themselves. The character of a 
creator agrees to God, and worship agrees to a creator, therefore 
worship agrees to God. 

The foundation of all negative conclusions is thi?, that where 
one of the two proposed ideas agrees with a third idea, and the 
other disagrees with it, they must needs disagree so far also with 
one another: as, if no sinners are happy, and if angels are happy, 
then angels are not sinners. 

Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion of a syllogism; 
it is a sentence or argument made up of three propositions, so 
disposed as that the last is necessarily inferred from those which 
go before, as in the instances which have been just mentioned. 

In the constitution of a syllogism two things may be considered, 
(viz.) the matter and the form of it. 

The matter of which a syllogism is made up is three proposi¬ 
tions; and these three propositions are made up of three ideas, or 
terms variously joined,—The three terms are called the remote 
matter of a syllogism ; and the three propositions the proximatp 
pr immediate matter of it. 



book iii, ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 37 

The three terms are named the major, the minor, and the 
middle. 

The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term be¬ 
cause it is generally of a larger extension than the minor term, or 
the subject. The major and minor terms are called the extremes. 

The middle term is the third idea invented anddisposed in two 
propositions in such a manner as to shew the connection between 
„ihe major and minor term in the conclusion; for which reason 
the middle term itself is sometimes called the argument. 

The proposition which contains the predicate of the conclusion, 
connected with the middle term, is usually called the major pro¬ 
position, whereas the minor proposition connects the middle term 
with the subject of the conclusion, and is sometimes called the 
^assumption. 

The form of a syllogism is the framing and disposing of the 
premises according to art, or just principles of reasoning, and the 
regular inference of the conclusion from them. 

The act of reasoning, or inferring one thing from another, is 
generally expressed and known by the particle therefore, when 
the argument is formed according to the rules of art; though in 
common discourse or writing, such casual particles as for, because, 
manifest the act of reasoning, as well as the illative particles then 
and therefore ; and wheresoever any of these words are used, 
there is a perfect syllogism expressed or implied, though perhaps 
the three propositions do not appear, or are not placed in regular 
forms, 

CHAPTER II. 

Of the various hinds of Syllogisms , with particular rules relating 

to them . 

SYLLOGISMS are divided into^various kinds, either according 
to the question which is proved by them, according to the nature 
and composition of them, according to the middle term, which is 
used to prove the question. 

SECTION I. 

Of universal and particular Syllogisms , both negative and 
affirmative . 

According to the question which is to be proved, syllogisms are 
divided into universal affirmative, universal negative, particular 



33 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK II U 


affirmative, and particular negative. This is often called a divi¬ 
sion of syllogisms drawn from the conclusions; for so many sorts 
of conclusions there may be which are marked with the letters 
A, E, I, O t 

In an universal affirmative syllogism, one idea is proved univer¬ 
sally to agree with another, and may be universally affirmed of it, 
as every sin deserves death, every unlawful wish is a sin; there¬ 
fore every unlawful wish deserves death. 

In an universal negative syllogism, one idea is proved to agree 
with another idea universally, and may be thus denied of it, as, 
no injustice can be pleasing to God : all persecution for the sake 
of conscience is injustice; therefore no persecution for conscience 
sake can be pleasing to God. 

Particular affirmative and particular negative syllogisms may be 
easily understood by what is said of universal, and there will be 
sufficient examples given of all these in the next section. 

SECTION II. 

Of plain simple Syllogisms, and their Rules . 

The next division of syllogisms is into single and compound. 

This is drawn from the nature and composition of them. 

Single syllogisms are made up of three propositions, compound 
syllogisms contain more than three propositions, and may be 
formed into two or more syllogisms. 

Single syllogisms, for distinction sake, may be divided into 
simple, complex, and conjunctive. 

Simple syllogisms have several rules belonging to them, which 
being observed, will generally secure us from false inferences; 
but these rules being founded on four general axioms, it is neces¬ 
sary to mention these axioms before-hand, for the use of those who 
will enter into the speculative reason of all these rules. 

Axiom 1. Particular propositions are contained in universals, 
and may be inferred from them; but universals are not contained 
in particulars, nor can be inferred from them. 

Axiom 2. In all universal propositions the subject is universal:, 
in all particular propositions the subject is particular. 

Axiom 3. In all affirmative propositions the predicate has no 
greater extension than the subject; for its extension is restrained 
by the subject, and therefore it is always to be esteemed as a par¬ 
ticular idea. It is by mere accident if it ever be taken universally. 


BOOK III. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


39 


and cannot happen but in such universal or singular propositions 
as are reciprocal. 

Axiom 4. The predicate of a negative proposition is always 
taken universally, for in its whole extension it is denied of the 
subject. If we say no stone is vegetable, we deny all sorts of 
vegetation concerning stones. 

The rules of simple regular syllogisms are these. 

Rule I. The middle term must not be taken twice particularly^ 
but once at least universally. For if the middle term be taken 
for two different parts or kinds of the same universal idea, then 
the subject of the conclusion is compared with one of these parts, 
and the predicate with another part, and this will never shew 
whether that subject and predicate agree or disagree: there will 
be then four distinct terms in the syllogism, and the two parts of 
the question will not be compared with the same third idea; 
as if I say, some men are pious, and some men are robbers, I can 
never infer that some robbers are pious, for the middle term, men, 
being taken twice particularly, it is not the same men who are 
spoken of in the major and minor propositions. 

Rule II. The terms in the conclusion must never be taken 
more universally than they are in the premises. The reason is 
derived from the first axiom, that generals can never be inferred 
from particulars. 

Rule III. A negative conclusion cannot be proved by two 
affirmative premises. For when the two terms of the conclusions 
are united or agree to the middle term, it does not follow by any 
means that they disagree with one another. 

Rule IV. If one of the premises be negative, the conclusion 
must be negative. For if the middle term be denied of either part 
of the conclusion, it may shew that the terms of the conclusion 
disagree, but it can never shew that they agree. 

Rule V. If either of the premises be particular, the conclusion 
must be particular. This may be proved for the most pail from 
the first axoim. 

These two last rules are sometimes united in this single sen¬ 
tence. The conclusion always follows the weaker part of the 
premises. Now negatives and particulars are counted inferior to 

affirmatives and universals. 

Rule VI. From two negative premises nothing can be con¬ 
cluded. For they separate the middle term both from the sub¬ 
ject and predicate of the conclusion, and when two ideas disagree 
to a third, we cannot infer that they either agree or disagree with 
each other. 




40 


book rrt. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

Yet where the negation is a part of the middle term the two 
premises may look like negatives according to the words, but one 
of them is atFirmative in sense; as, what has no thought cannot 
reason; but a worm has no thought; therefore a worm cannot 
reason. The minor proposition does really affirm the middle term 
concerning the subject, (viz.) a worm is what has no thought, 
and thus it is properly in this syllogism an affirmative proposition. 

Rule VII. From two particular premises nothing can be con¬ 
cluded. This rule depends chiefly on the first axiom. 

SECTION III. 

Of the Moods and Figures of simple Syllogisms • 

The figure of a syllogism is the proper disposition of the mid¬ 
dle term with the parts of the question. 

A mood is the regular determination of propositions according 
to their quantity and quality, i. e. their universal or particular 
affirmation or negation; which are signified by certain artificial 
words wherein the consonants are neglected, and these four 
vowels A, E, I, O, are only regarded. 

These are generally counted three figures. 

In the first of them the middle term is the subject of the major 
proposition, and the predicate of the minor. This contains four 
moods, (viz.) Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio. And it is the ex¬ 
cellency of this figure that all sorts of questions or conclusions 
may be proved by it, whether A, E, I, or O, i. e. universal or 
particular, affirmative or negative, as, 

Bar- Every wicked man is truly miserable ; 

ba- All tyrants are wicked men : 

ra. Therefore all tyrants are truly miserable. 

Ce- He that is always in fear i9 not happy ; 
la- Covetous men are always in fear: 
rent. Therefore covetous men are not happy. 

Da- Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us ; 
ri- Some afflictions further our salvation : 
i. Therefore some afflictions are good for u9. 

Fe- Nothing that must be repented of is truly desirable ; 
ri- Some pleasures must be repented of: 
o. Therefore there are some pleasures which are not truly 
desirable. 


BOOK 111. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


41 


In the second figure the middle term is the predicate of both 
the premises: this contains four moods (viz.) Cesare, Camestres, 
Festino, Barocco ; and it admits only of negative conclusions; as* 

Ce- No liar is fit to be believed ; 

sa- Every good Christian is fit to be believed: 

re. Therefore no good Christian is a liar. 

The third figure requires that the. middle term be the subject of 
both the premises. It has six moods, (viz.) Darepti, Felapton, 
Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison; and it admits only of par¬ 
ticular conclusions; as. 

Da- Whosoever loves God shall be saved ; 

rep- All the lovers of God have their imperfections: 

ti. Therefore some who have imperfections shall be saved. 

The moods of these three figures are comprised in four Latiti 
verses.’ 

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio quoque prima. 

Cesare, Camestres, Festino , Barocco, secundce. 

Tertia Darepti sibi vindicat , atque Felapton. 

Adjungens Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison. 

The special rules of the three figures are these: 

In the first figure the major proposition must always be uni¬ 
versal, and the minor affirmative. 

In the second figure, also, the major must be universal; and one 
of the premises, together with the conclusion, must be negative. 

In the third figure the minor must be affirmative, and the con¬ 
clusion always particular. 

There is also a fourth figure, wherein the middle term is pre¬ 
dicated in the major proposition, and subjected in the minor; 
but this is a very indirect manner of concluding, and is never 
used in the sciences, nor in human life, and therefore useless. 
Some Logicians will allow it to be nothing else but a mere inver¬ 
sion of the first figure: the moods of it are Baralipton or Barbari, 
Celantes, Dabitis, Fapismo, Ferison. 


No. 1. 


F 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, 


BOOK III* 


44 


SECTION IV. 

Of complex Syllogisms• 

It is not the mere use of complex terms in a syllogism that 
gives it this name, though one of the terms is usually complex ; 
but those are properly called complex syllogisms, in which the 
middle term is connected with the whole subject, or the whole 
predicate, in two distinct propositions; but is intermingled and 
compared with them by parts, or in a more confused manner, in 
different forms of speech ; as. 

The sun is a senseless being: 

The Persians worshipped the sun; 

Therefore the Persians worshipped a senseless being. 

Here thd predicate of the conclusion is,, worshipped a senseless 
being; part of which is joined with the middle term sun in the 
major proposition, and the other part in the minor. 

Though this sort of argument is confessed to be entangled, or 
confused and irregular, if examined by the rules of simple syllo¬ 
gisms; yet there is a great variety of arguments' used in books of 
learning, and in common life, whose consequence is strong and 
evident, and which must be ranked under this head ; as, 

I. Exclusive propositions will form a complex argument; as, 
pious men are the only favourites of heaven; true Christians are 
favourites of heaven: therefore true Christians are pious men. 
Or thus, hypocrites are not pious men ; therefore hypocrites ate 
no favourites of heaven. 

II. Exceptive propositions will make such complex syllogisms ; 
as, none but physicians came to the consultation; the nurse is no 
physician : therefore the nurse came not to the consultation. 

III. Or, comparative propositions; as, knowledge is better than 
riches ; virtue is better than knowledge: therefore virtue is bett&f 
than riches. Or thus; a dove will fly a mile in a minute: a swal¬ 
low flies swifter than a dove: therefore a swallow will fly more 
than a mile in a minute. 

IV. Or inceptive and desitive propositions; as, the fogs vanish 
as the sun rises; but the fogs have not yet begun to vanish; 
therefore the sun is not yet risen. 

V. Or modal propositions; as, it is necessary that a general 
understand the art ofjwar; but Caius does not understand the 
art of war: therefore it is necessary Caius should not be a gene- 


BOOK III. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


43 


ral. Or thus: a total eclipse of the sun would cause darkness at 
jaoon ; it is possible that the moon at that time may totally eclipse 
the sun: therefore it is possible that the moon may cause dark¬ 
ness at noon. 

Beside all these, there is a great number of complex syllogisms 
which can hardly be reduced under any particular titles, because 
the forms ot human language are so exceedingly various; as, 

Christianity requires us to beleive what the apostles wrotej 
St. Paul is an apostle : therefore Christianity requires us to believe 
what St. Paul wrote. 

No human artist can make an animal; a fly or a worm is an 
animal : therefore no human artist can make a fly or a worm. 

The father always lived in London ; the son always lived with 
the father: therefore the son always lived in London. 

The blossom soon follows the full bud; this pear-tree hath 
many full buds: therefore it will shortly have many blossoms* 

One hail-stone never falls alone ; but a hail-stone fell just now: 
therefore others fell with it, 

Thunder seldom comes yvithout lightning; but it thundered 
yesterday : therefore, probably, it lightened also. 

Moses wrote before the Trojan war; the first Greek historians 
wrote after the Trojan war; therefore the first Greek historians 
wrote after Moses.* 

Now the force of all these arguments is so evident and conclu¬ 
sive, that though the form of the syllogisms be never so irregular, 
yet we are sure the inferences are just and true; for the pre¬ 
mises, according to the reason of things, do really contain the con¬ 
clusion that is deduced from them, which is a never-failing test of 
true syllogisms, as shall be shewn hereafter. 

The truth of most of these complex syllogism? may also bis 
made to appear (if needful) by reducing them either to regular 
simple syllogisms, or to some of the conjunctive syllogisms, which 
are described in the next section. I will give an instance only in 
the first, and leave the rest to exercise the ingenuity of the 
reader. 

The first argument may be reduced to a syl|ogi$rp, in Barbara, 
thus: 

The sun is a senseless being; 

* Perhaps some of these syllogisms may be reduced to those which I call con¬ 
nective afterwards ; but it is of little moment to what species they belong ; for it ie 
not any formal set of rules, so much as the evidence and force of reason, that raus| 
determine the truth or falsehood of all such syllogisms. 


44 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, 


book ii r. 


What the Persians worshipped is the sun : 

Therefore what the Persians worshipped is a senseless being. 
Though the conclusive force of this argument is evident without 
this reduction. 


SECTION V. 

Of conjunctive Syllogisms, 

Those are called conjunctive syllogisms, wherein one of the 
premises, namely the major, has distinct parts, which is joined 
by a conjunction, or some such particle of speech. Most times 
the major or minor, or both, are explicitly compound proposi¬ 
tions : and generally the major proposition is made up of two 
distinct parts or propositions, in such a manner, as that by the 
assertion of one in the minor, the other is either asserted or 
denied in the conclusion; or, by the denial of one in the miner, 
the other is either asserted or denied in the conclusion. It is 
hardly possible, indeed, to fit any short definition to include all the 
kinds of them: but the chief amongst them are the conditional 
syllogism, the disjunctive, the relative, and the connective 

I. The conditional or hypothetical syllogisms are those, whose 
major, or minor, or both, are conditional propositions; as, If 
there be a God, the world is governed by Providence; but there 
is a God: therefore the world is governed by Providence. 

These syllogisms admit two sorts of true argumentation where 
the major is conditjpnal. 

1. When the antecedent is asserted in the minor, that the con¬ 
sequence may be asserted in the conclusion : such is the preceding 
example. This is called arguing from the position of the antece¬ 
dent to the position of the consequent. 

2. When the consequent is contradicted in the minor proposi¬ 
tion, that the antecedent may be contradicted in the conclusion; 
as, if atheists are in the right, then the world exists without a 
cause; but the world does not exist without a cause: therefore 
atheists are not in the right. This is called arguing from the 
removing of the consequent to the removing of the antecedent. 

To remove the antecedent or consequent here does not merely 
signify the denial of it, but the contradiction of it; for the mere 
denial of it by a contrary proposition will not make a true syllo¬ 
gism, as appears thus: If every creature be reasonable, every 
brute is reasonable; but no brute is reasonable: therefore nq 


BOOK III. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


45 


creature is reasonable. Whereas, if you say in the minor, but 
every brute is not reasonable: then it would follow truly in the 
conclusion, therefore every creature is not reasonable. 

When the antecedent or consequent are negative propositions, 
they are removed by an affirmative; as. If there be no God, then 
the world does not discover creating wisdom; but the world 
does discover creating wisdom : therefore there is a God. In this 
instance the consequent is removed or contradicted in the minor, 
that the antecedent may be contradicted in the conclusion. So in 
this argument of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. “ If the dead rise not, 
Christ died in vain;” but Christ did not die in vain: therefore jthe 
dead shall rise. 

There are also two sorts of false arguing, viz. (1.) from the re¬ 
moving of the antecedent to the removing of the consequent; or, 
(2.) from the position of the consequent to the position of the 
antecedent. Examples of these are easily framed; as, 

(1.) If a minister were a prince, he must be honoured ; but a 
minister is not a prince : 

Therefore he must not be honoured. 

(2.) If a minister were a prince he must be honoured; but a 
minister must be honoured; 

Therefore he is a prince. 

Who sees not the falsehood of both these syllogisms? 

II. A disjunctive syllogism is when the major proposition is 
disjunctive ; as, The earth moves in a circle or an ellipsis ; but it 
does not move in a circle : therefore it moves in an ellipsis. 

A disjunctive syllogism may have many members or parts, thus: 
it is either spring, summer, autumn, or winter; but it is not 
spring, autumn, or winter: therefore it is summer. 

The true method of arguing here is from the assertion of one to 
the denial of the rest, or from the denial of one or more to the 
assertion of what remains; but the major should be so framed 
that several parts of it cannot be true together, though one of 
them is evidently true. 

III. A relative syllogism requires the major proposition to be 
relative; as, Where Christ is, there shall his servants be; but 
Christ is in heaven : therefore his servants shall be there also. 
Or, as is the captain, so are his soldiers; but the captain is a 
toward : therefore his soldiers are so too. 

Arguments that relate to the doctrine of proportion must be 
jreferred to this head ; as, As two are to four, so are three to six ; 




46 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. book nr, 

but two make the half of four: therefore three make the half 
of six. 

Besides these, there is another sort of syllogism, which is very 
natural and common, and yet authors take very little notice of it, 
call it by an improper name, and describe it vejy defectively ; and 
that is, 

IV. A connective syllogism. This some have called copula** 
live; but it does by no means require the major to be a copula¬ 
tive or a compound proposition, (according to the definition 
given of it, Part II. chap, ii. sec, 6.) ; but it requires that two or 
more ideas be so connected, either in the complex subject or pre¬ 
dicate of the major, that if one of them be affirmed or denied in 
the mitior, common sense will naturally shew us what will be the 
consequence. It would be very tedious and useless to frame par¬ 
ticular rules about them, as will appear by the following exam¬ 
ples, which are very various, and yet may be farther multiplied. 

(1.) Meekness and humility always go together; Moses was a 
man of meekness: therefore Moses was also humble. Or we may 
form this minor; Pharoah was no humble man: therefore he was 
not meek. 

(2.) No man can serve God and Mammon; the covetous map 
serves Mammon : therefore he cannot serve God. O r the minor 
may run thus: The true Christian serves God; therefore he does 
not serve Mammon. 

(3.) Genius must join with study to ?nake a great man; Fiorina 
has genius, but he cannot study : therefore Fiorina will never be 
a great man. Or thus, Quintus studies hard, but has no genius; 
therefore Quintus will never be a great man. 

(4.) Gulo cannot make a dinner without flesh and fish ; there 
was no fish to be gotten to-day; therefore Gulo, this day, cannot 
make a dinner. 

(5.) London and Paris are in different latitudes; the latitude of 
London is 51 deg. and a half: therefore this cannot be the latitude 
of Paris. 

(6.) Joseph and Benjamin had one mother; Rachel was the 
mother of Joseph : therefore she was Benjamin’s mother too. 

(7.) The father and the son are of equal stature; the father is 
six feet high : therefore the son is six feet also. 

(8.) Pride is inconsistent with innocence; angels have inno¬ 
cence : therefore they have no pride. Or thus, devils have pride • 
therefore they have not innocence. 




fcOQIC III* 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC; 


47 


SECTION VI. 

Of Compound SyUogis?ns t 

We properly call those compound syllogisms which are made 
6f two or more single syllogisms; and may be resolved into them : 
the chief kinds are these; Epichirema, Dilemma, Prosyllogism, 
Sorites, and Induction. 

I. Epichirema is a syllogism, which contains the proof of the 
major or minor, or both, before it draws the conclusion. This is 
often used in writing, in public speeches, and in common conver¬ 
sation, that so each part of the discourse may be confirmed and 
put out of doubt, as it moves on towards the conclusion which 
was chiefly designed. Take this instance : 

Sickness may be good for us ; for it weans us from the pleasures 
of life, and makes us think of dying; 

But we are uneasy under sickness; which appears by our im¬ 
patience, complaints, groaning, &c. 

Therefore we are uneasy sometimes under that which is good 
for us* 

Another instance you may see in Cicero’s oration in defence of 
Milo, who had slain Clodius. His major proposition is, that it is 
lawful for one man to kill another who lies in wait to kill him; 
which he proves from the custom of nations, from natural equity, 
examples, &c. his minor is, that Clodius laid wait for Milo; which 
he proves by his arms, guards, &c. and then infers the conclusion, 
that it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 

II. A Dilemma is an argument, which divides the whole into 
all its parts or members by a disjunctive proposition, and then 
infers something concerning each part which is finally inferred 
concerning the whole. Instances of this are frequent; as. In this 
life we must either obey our vicious inclinations or resist them ; 
to obey them will bring sin and sorrow, to resist them is laborious 
and painful: therefore we cannot be perfectly free from sorrow 
or pain in this life. 

A Dilemma becomes faulty or ineffectual three ways; first, 
when the members of the division are not well opposed, or not 
fully enumerated ; for then the major is false. Secondly, when 
what is asserted concerning each part is not just; for then the 
minor is not true. Thirdly, when it may be retorted with equal 
force upon him who utters it. 

III. A Prosyllogism is when two or more syllogisms are so con¬ 
nected together, that the conclusion of the former is the major or 



4S 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. book itf. 

minor of the following; as, Blood cannot think ; but the soul of 
man thinks: therefore the soul of man is not blood; but the soul 
of a brute is his blood, according to the Scripture; therefore the 
soul of a man is different from the soul of a brute, 

IV. A Sorites is when several middle terms are chosen to con¬ 
nect one another successively in several propositions, till the last 
proposition connects its predicate with the first subject. Thus y ^ 
all men of revenge have their souls often uneasy ; uneasy souls are 
a plague to themselves; now to be one’s own plague is folly in 
the extreme ; therefore all men of revenge are extreme fools. 

The apostle, Rom. viii. 29, gives us an instance of this sort of 
argument, if it were reduced to exact form : Whom he foreknew 
those he predestinated; whom he predestinated he called; whom 
he called he justified; whom he justified he glorified: therefore 
whom he foreknew he glorified. 

V. Induction is when from several particular propositions we 
infer one general; as, the doctrine of theSocinians cannot be proved 
from the Gospel, it cannot be proved from the Acts of the Apos¬ 
tles, it cannot be proved from the Epistles, nor the Book of Reve¬ 
lation ; therefore it cannot be proved from the New Testament. 

Ttiis sort of argument is defective when there is not due care 
taken to enumerate all the particulars on which the conclusion 
should depend. 

All these five kinds of syllogisms may be called redundant, 
because they have more than three propositions. But there is one 
sort of syllogism which is defective, and is called an Enthymeme ? 
because only the conclusion, with one of the premises is expressed,^ 
while the other is supposed and reserved in the mind : thus, there 
is no true religion without good morals: therefore a knave cannot 
be truly religious: or thus, it is our duty to love our neighbours* 
as ourselves; therefore there are but few who perform their 
duty. 

This is the most common sort of argument, both in writing and 
in speaking: as it would too much retard the discourse to draw 
out all our arguments in mood and figure. 

If there be any debate about this argument, the syllogism must 
be completed, in order to try its force and goodness, by adding, 
the absent proposition. 


fiOOK tit. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


49 


SECTION VII. 

Of the middle Terms, of common Places or Topics , and Invention 
of Arguments . 

The next division of syllogisms is according to the middle term, 
ivhich is made use of in the proof of any proposition. Now the 
middle term {as we have stated before) is often called Argument, 
because the force of the syllogism depends upon it. We shall 
digress here to treat briefly of the doctrine of topics, or places 
whence middle terms or arguments are drawn. 

All arts and sciences have some general subjects which belong 
‘to them, which are called Topics or common places; because 
middle terms are borrowed, and arguments derived from them for 
the proof of their various propositions which we have occasion 
to discourse of. The topics of Grammar are etymology, noun, 
verb, construction, signification, &c. The topics of Logic are 
genus, species, difference, property, definition, division, &c. The 
topics of Ontology or Metaphysics, are cause, effect, action, pas¬ 
sion, indentity, opposition, subject, adjunct, sign, &c. The topics 
of Morality or Ethics, are law, sin, duty, authority, freedom of 
will, command, threatening, reward, punishment, &c. The topics 
of Theology are, God, Christ, faith, hope, worship, salvation, See. 

To these several topics there belong particular observations, 
axioms, canons, or rules*, which are laid down in their proper 
sciences; as. 

Grammar hath such canon, (viz.) Words in a differentconstruc- 
tion obtain a different sense. Words derived from the same pri- 
mative may probably have some affinity in their original mean¬ 
ing, See. 

Canons in logic are such as these: Every part of a division 
singly taken must contain less than the whole. A definition must 
be peculiar and proper to the thing defined. Whatever is affirmed 
or denied of the genus, may be affirmed or denied of the spe¬ 
cies, &c. 

Metaphysical canon9 are such as these; Final causes belong only 
to intelligent agents. If a natural and necessary cause operate, 
the etfect will follow, &c. and there are large catalogues of many 
more in each distinct science. 

* A canon is a proposition declaring some property of the subject, which is not 
expressed in the definition or division of it. 

No. L G 


50 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK III* 


SECTION VIII. 

Of several kinds of Arguments and Demonstrations. 

We proceed now to the division of syllogisms according to the 
middle term ; and in this part of our treatise the syllogisms them¬ 
selves are properly called arguments, and are thus distributed. 

I. Arguments are called Grammatical, Logical, Metaphysical, 
Physical, Moral, Mechanical, Theological, &c. according to the 
art, science, or subject, whence the middle term or topic is bor¬ 
rowed. Thus, if we prove that no man should steal from his 
ueighbour, because the scripture forbids it, this is a theological 
argument; if we prove it from the laws of the land, it is political, 
but if we prove it from the principles of reason and equity, the 
argument is moral. 

II. Arguments are either certain and evident, or doubtful and 
merely probable. 

Probable arguments are those whose conclusions are proved by 
some probable medium ; as, this hill was once a church-yard, or a 
field of battle, because there are many human bones found here. 
This is not a certain argument, for human bones might have been 
conveyed there some other way. 

Evident and certain arguments are called demonstrations; for 
they prove their conclusions by clear mediums and undoubted 
principles; and they are generally divided into these two sorts: 

1. Demonstrations a priori, which prove the effect by its ne¬ 
cessary cause; as, 1 prove the scripture is infallibly true; because 
it is the word of God, who cannot lie. 

2. Demonstrations a posteriori, which infer the cause from its 
necessary effects; as, [infer there hath been the hand of some 
artificer here, because I' find a curious engine. Or, I infer there 
is a God, from the works of his wisdom in the visible world. 

The last of these is called " demonstrate tou oti,” because it 
proves only the existence of a thing ; the first named “ demon¬ 
strate TOU D10TI,” because it shews also the cause of existence. 

III. Arguments are divided into artificial and inartificial. 

An artificial argument is taken from the nature and circum¬ 
stances ol the things; and if the argument be strong, it produces a 
natural certainty ; as, the world was at first created by God, be¬ 
cause nothing can create itself. 

An inartificial argument is the testimony of another, and this 
is called original, when our information proceeds immediately 


BOOK III. 


M 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

from the persons concerned, or from eye or ear-witnessess of the 
fact: it is called tradition when it is delivered by the report of 
others. 

IV. Arguments are either direct or indirect. It is a direct ar¬ 
gument.where the middle term is such as proves the question itself, 
and infers that very proposition which was the matter of enquiry. 
An indirect or oblique argument proves or refutes some other 
proposition, and thereby makes the thing enquired appear to be 
true by plain consequence. 

Several arguments are called indirect; as, (1.) when some com 
tradictory proposition is proved to be false, improbable or impos¬ 
sible: or when, upon supposition of the falsehood, or denial of 
the original proposition, some absurdity is inferred. This is 
called a proof per impossibile, or a reductio ad absurdum. (2.) 
When some other proposition is proved to be true which is less 
probable, and thence it follows, that the original proposition is 
true; because it is more probable. This is an argument ex magis 
probabili ad minus. (3.) When any other proposition is proved 
upon which it was before agreed to yield the original question. 
This is an argument ex concesso. 

V. There is yet another rank of arguments which have Latin 
names; their true distinction is derived from the topics or middle 
terms which are used in them, though they are called an address 
to our judgment, our faith, our ignorance, our profession, our 
modesty, or our passions. 

1. If an argument be taken from the nature or existence of 
things, and addressed to the reason of mankind, it is called argu- 
mentum ad judicium. 

*2. When it is borrowed from some convincing testimony, it is 
called argumentum ad fidem, an address to our faith. 

3. When it was drawn from any insufficient medium what¬ 
soever, and yet the opposer has not skill to refute or answer it, 
this is argumentum ad ignorantiam, an address to our ignorance. 

4. When it is built upon the professed principles or opinions 
of the person with whom we argue, whether the opinions be true 
or false, it is named argumentum ad hominem, an address to our 
professed principles. St. Paul often uses this argument when he 
reasons with the Jews, and when he says, I speak as a man. 

5. When the argument is fetched from the sentiments of some 
wise, great,or good men, whose authority we reverence and hard-, 
ly dare oppose, it is called argumentum ad verecundiam, an ad-, 
dress to our modesty. 

6. I add finally, when an argument is borrowed from any topics 
which are suited to engage the inclinations and passions of the 


52 


BOOK lit. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

hearers on the side of the speaker, rather than to convince the 
judgment, this is argumentum ad passiones, an address to the 
passions: or if it be made publicly, it is called ad populum, orau 
appeal to the people. 

If a syllogism agree with the rules which are given for the con¬ 
struction and regulation of it, it is called a true argument: if it 
disagree with these rules, it is a paralogism, or false argument: 
but when a false argument puts on the face and appearance of a 
true one, then it is properly called a sophism or fallacy, which 
shall be the subject of the next chapter. 

CHAPTER III. 

Of Sophisms. 

FROM truth nothing can really follow but what is true; when-* 
soever therefore we find a false conclusion drawn from premises 
which seem to be true, there must be some fault in the deduction 
or inference: or else one of the premises is not true in the sense 
in which it is used in that argument. 

When an argument carries the face of truth with it, and yet 
leads us into mistake, it is a sophism: and there is some need 
of a particular description of these fallacious arguments, that we 
may with more ease and readiness detect and solve them. 

SECTION I, 

Of several kinds of Sophisms and their Solutions . 

As the rules of right judgment and of good ratiocination often 
coincide with each other, so the doctrine of prejudices, which was 
treated of in the second part of logic, has anticipated a great deal 
of what might be said on the subject of sophisms; yet I shall 
mention the most remarkable springs of false argumentation which 
are reduced by logicians to some of the following heads. 

I. The first sort of sophism is called Jgnoratw Elenchi , or a 
mistake of the question; that is, when something else is proved 
which has neither any necessary connection or inconsistency with 
the thing required, and consequently gives no determination to 
the enquiry, though it may seem at first sight to determine the 
question; as, if any should conclude that St. Paul was not a 
illative Jew, by proving that he was bofn a Roman. These 


BOOK III. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


53 


sophisms are refuted by shewing that both may be true: for he 
was born of Jewish parents in the city of Tarsus, and by some 
peculiar privilege granted to his parents, or his native city, he was 
born a denizen of Rome. 

II. The next sophism is called Petitio Principii , or a suppo¬ 
sition of what is not granted; that is, when any proposition is 
proved by the same proposition in other words, or by something 
that is equally uncertain and disputed : as if any one undertook 
to prove that the human soul is extended through all the parts of 
the body, because it resides in every member, which is but the 
same thing in other words. 

III. That sort of fallacy which is called a Circle is very near a 
kin to the petitio principii; as, when one of the premises in a syL 
iogism is questioned and opposed, and we intend to prove it by 
the conclusion: or, when in a train of syllogisms we prove the 
last by recurring to what was the conclusion of the first. 

IV. The next kind of sophism is called Non causa Pro causa , 
or the assignation of a false cause. This the Peripatetic philoso¬ 
phers were guilty of continually, when they told us that certain 
beings, which they called substantial forms, were the springs of 
colour, motion, vegetation, and the various operations of natural 
being in the animate and inanimate world; when they informed 
us that nature was terribly afraid of a vacuum, and that it was 
the cause why the water would not fall out of a long tube if it 
was turned upside down: the moderns as well astheancients fall 
often into this fallacy, when they positively assign the reasons of 
natural appearances, without sufficient experiments to prove 
them, 

V. The next is called fallacia accidentis , or a sophism wherein 
we pronounce concerning the nature and essential properties of 
any subject according to something which is merely accidental to 
it. This is very frequent in human life. So if opium or the Pe¬ 
ruvian bark has been imprudently or unsuccessfully, wheieby the 
patient has received injury, some weaker people absolutely pro¬ 
nounce against the use of the bark or opium upon all occasions 
whatsoever, and are ready to call them poison. So wine has been 
the accidental occasion of drunkenness and quarrels; learning and 
printing may have been the accidental cause of sedition in a state; 
the reading of the bible by accident has been abused to promote 
heresies or destructive errors ; and for these reasons they have been 
all pronounced evil things. Mahomet forbade his followers the 
use of wine; the Turks discourage learning in their dominions. But 


54 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


book m. 


how very unreasonable are the inferences and the prohibitions 
which are built upon them ! 

VI. The next sophism borders upon the former; and that is, 
when we argue from that which is true in particular circum¬ 
stances to prove the same thing true absolutely, simply, and ab¬ 
stracted from all circumstances; this is called in the schools a 
sophism ; A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter ; as, that 
which is bought in the shambles is eaten for dinner; raw meat is 
bought in the shambles, therefore raw meat is eaten for dinner. 
Or thus, Livy writes fables and improbabilities when he describes 
prodigies and omens: therefore Livy’s Roman history is never 
to be believed in any thing. Or thus, there may be some mistake 
of transcribers in some part of scripture : therefore scripture 
alone is not a safe guide for our faith. 

This sort of sophism has its reverse also; as when we argue 
from that which is true simply and absolutely to prove the same 
thing true in all particular circumstances whatsoever: as if a 
traitor should argue from the sixth commandment,Thou shall not 
kill a man, to prove that he himself ought not to be hanged : or 
if a madman was to tell me I ought not to withhold his sword 
from him, because no man ought to withhold the property of 
another. 

These two species of sophisms are easily solved by shewing 
the difference betwixt things in their absolute nature, and the 
same things surrounded with peculiar circumstances, and con¬ 
sidered in regard to special times, places, persons, and occasions; 
or by shewing the difference between a moral and metaphysical 
universality, and that the proposition will hold good in one case, 
but not in the other. 

VII. The sophisms of composition and division come next to 
be considered. 

The sophism of composition is when we infer any thing con¬ 
cerning ideas in a compounded sense, which is only true in a 
divided sense. And when it is said in the gospel that Christ 
made the blind to see, and the deaf to hear, and the lame to walk, 
we ought not to inferhence, thatChrist performed contradictions; 
but those who were blind before were made to see, and those who 
were deaf before were made to hear, &c. So when he scripture 
assures us the worst of sinners may be saved, it signifies only, 
that they who have been the worst of sinners may repent and be 
saved, not that they shall be saved in their sins. Or if any one 
should argue thus, two and three are even and odd ; five are two 
and three; therefore five are even and odd. Here that is very 


BOOK 111. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 


55 


falsely inferred concerning two or three in union, which is only 
two of them divided. 

The sophism of division is when we infer the same thing con¬ 
cerning ideas in a divided sense, which is only true in a com¬ 
pounded sense; as, if we should pretend to prove that every 
soldier in the Grecian army put an hundred thousand Persians to 
flight, because the Grecian soldiers did so. Or if a man should 
argue thus; five is one number; two and three are five: therefore 
two and three are one number. 

This sort of sophism is committed when the word all is taken 
in a collective and a distributive sense, without a due distinction; 
as, if any one should reason thus; all the musical instruments of 
the Jewish temple, made a noble concert: the harp is a musical 
instrument of the Jewish temple, therefore the harp made a 
a noble concert. Here the word all in the major is collective, 
whereas uch a conclusion requires that the word All should be 
distributive. 

It is the same fallacy when the universal word All or No refers 
to species in one proposition, and to individuals in another; as, 
all animals were in Noah’s ark; theiefore no animals perished 
in the flood : whereas in the premise all animals signifies every 
kind of animals, which does not exclude or deny the drowning of 
a thousand individuals. 

VIII. The last sort of sophisms arises from our abuse of the 
ambiguity of words, which is the largest and most extensive kind 
of fallacy ; and indeed several of the former fallacies might be 
reduced to this head. 

• When the words or phrases are plainly equivocal, they are called 
Sophisms of Equivocation ; as, if we should argue thus, he that 
sends forth a book into the light, desires it to be read; he that 
throws a book into the fire, sends it into the light: therefore he 
that throws a book into the fire desires it to be read. 

This sophism, as well as the foregoing, and all of the like na¬ 
ture, are solved by shewing the different senses of the words, 
terms, or phrases. Here Light in the major proposition signifies 
the public view of the world; in the minor it signifies the bright¬ 
ness of flame and fire, and therefore the syllogism has four terms, 
or rather it has no middle term, and proves nothing. 

There is, after all these, another sort of sophism which is wont 
to be called an imperfect Enumeration, or a false Induction ; when 
from a few experiments or observations, men infer general theo¬ 
rems and universal propositions. But this is sufficiently noticed 
in the foregoing chapter, where we treated of that sort of syllogism 
which is called Induction. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK III. 


56 


SECTION II. 


Two general Tests of true Syllogisms , and Methods of solving all 

Syllogisms 4 

Besides the special description of true syllogisms and sophisms 
already given, and the rules by which the one are framed, and 
the other refuted, there are these two general methods of reducing 
all syllogisms whatsoever '•<> a test of their truth or falsehood. 

I. The first is, that the premises must (at least implicitly) con¬ 
tain the conclusion: or thus: one of the premises must contain 
the conclusion, and the other must shew that the conclusion is 
contained in it. The reason of this rule is this: when any 
proposition is otfered to be proved, it is necessary to find another 
proposition which confirms it, which may be called the containing 
proposition; but because the second must not contain the first 
in an express manner, and in the same words*, therefore it is 
necessary that a third or ostensive proposition be found out, to 
shew that the second proposition contains the first, which was to 
be proved. Let us make an experiment of this syllogism. Who., 
soever is a slave to his natural inclinations is miserable: the 
wicked man is a slave to his natural inclinations: therefore the 
wicked man is miserable. Here it is evident that the major pro¬ 
position contains the conclusion ; for under the general character 
of a slave to natural inclinations, a wicked man i,s contained or 
included: and the minor proposition declares it; whence thar 
Conclusion is evidently deduced, that the wicked man is miser¬ 
able. 

In many affirmative syllogisms we may suppose either the 
major or the minor to contain the conclusion, and the other to 
shew it; for there is no great difference. But in negative syllo¬ 
gisms it is the negative proposition that contains the conclusion, 
and the affirmative proposition shews it; as, every wise man 
masters his passions; no angry man masters his passion : there¬ 
fore no angry man is wise. Here it is more natural to suppose 


* It is confessed, that the conditional and disjunctive major propositions do 
expressly contain all that is in the conclusion ; but then it is not in a certain and 
conclusive manner, but only in a dubious form of speech, and mingled with other 
terms, uud therefore it is not the same express proposition. 




BOOK 111. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


57 


the minor to be the containing proposition: it is the minor im¬ 
plicitly denies wisdom concerning an angry man, because master¬ 
ing the passions is included in wisdom, and the major shews it. 

II. The second is this; as the terms in every syllogism are 
usually repeated twice, so they must be taken precisely in the 
same sense in both places ; for the greatest part of mistakes that 
arise in forming syllogisms, is derived from some little difference 
in the sense of one of the terms in the two parts of the syllogisms 
wherein it is used. Let us consider the following sophisms. 

1. It is a sin to kill a man ; a murderer is a man; therefore it 
is a sin to kill a murderer. Here the word kill in the first pro¬ 
position signifies to kill unjustly, or without a law ; in the con¬ 
clusion it is taken absolutely for putting a man to death in general, 
and therefore the inference is not good. 

-2. What I am, you are not; but I am a man: therefore you are 
not a man. This is a relative syllogism ; but if it be reduced to 
a regular categorical form, it will appear there is ambiguity in 
the terms, thus : what I am is a man; you are not what I am: 
therefore you are not a man. Here what I am in the major pro¬ 
position, is taken especially for my nature: but in the minor pro¬ 
position the same words are taken individually for my person; 
therefore the inference must be false, for the syllogisms do not 
take the term what I am both times in the same sense. 

3. He that says you are an animal, says true; but he says you 
are a goose, because you are an animal: therefore he that says 
you are a goose says true. In the major proposition the word 
animal is the predicate of an incidental proposition: which inci¬ 
dental proposition being affirmative, renders the predicate of it 
particular, according to Chap. II. Sect. 2. Axiom 3. and conse¬ 
quently the word animal there signifies only human animality. 
In the minor proposition, the word animal, for the same reason, 
signifies the animality of a goose; whereby it becomes an ambi¬ 
guous term, and unfit to build the conclusion upon. Or if you 
say the word animal, in the minor, is taken for human animality, 
then the minor is evidently false. 

It is from this last general test of syllogisms that we derive 
the custom of the respondent in answering the arguments of the 
opponent, which is to distinguish upon the major or minor pro¬ 
position, and declare which term is used in two senses, and in 
what sense the proposition may be true, and in what sense it is 
false. 


No. 1. 


H 




THE 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

BOOK IV. 

OF DISPOSITION AND METHOD. 


CHAPTER I. 

Of the nature of Method, and the several kinds of it, (viz.) Natu - 
ral and Arbitrary, Synthetic and Analytic. 

DISPOSITION or METHOD, taken in the largest sense, 
implies the placing of several things, or performing several ope¬ 
rations, in such an order, as is most convenient to attain some end 
proposed i and in this sense it is applied to all the works of nature 
and art, to all the divine affairs of creation and providence; and 
to the artifices, schemes, contrivances, and practices of mankind, 
whether in natural, civil, or sacred affairs. 

Now this orderly disposition of things includes the ideas of 
prior, posterior, and simultaneous; of superior, inferior, and equal; 
of beginning, end, and middle, &c. among the general affections 
of being in ontology. 

But in Logic method is usually taken in a more limited sense, 
and the nature of it is thus described : Method is a disposition in 
such order as may best serve to find out unknown truths, to ex¬ 
plain and confirm truths that are known, or to fix them in the 
memory. 

It is distributed into two general kinds, (viz.) natural and 
arbitrary. 

Natural method is that which observes the order of nature, 
and proceeds in such a manner, as that the knowledge of the 




BOOK IV. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 5 g 

things which follow depends, in a great measure, on the things 
which go before, and this is twofold, (viz.) Synthetic and Analytic, 
which are sometimes called Synthesis and Analysis. 

Synthetic method is that which begins with the parts*, and 
leads on ward to the knowledge of the whole; it begins with the most 
simple principles and general truths, and proceeds by degrees to 
that which is drawn from or compounded of them: and therefore 
it is called the method of composition. 

Analytic method takes the whole compound as it finds it, whe¬ 
ther it be a species or an individual, and leads us into the know¬ 
ledge of it by resolving it into its first principles or parts, its 
generic nature, and its special properties; and therefore it is called 
the method of resolution. 

As synthetic method is generally used in teaching the sciences, 
after they are invented, so analytic is most practised in finding 
out things unknown. Though it must be confessed that both 
methods are sometimes employed to find out truth, and to com¬ 
municate it. 

If we know the parts of any subject easier and better than the 
whole, we consider the parts distinctly, and, by putting them 
together, we come to the knowledge of the whole. So in gram¬ 
mar we learn first to know letters, we join them to make sylla¬ 
bles, out of syllables we compose words, and out of words we 
make sentences and discourses. So the physician or apothecary 
knows the nature and powers of his simples, (viz.) his drugs, his 
herbs, his minerals, &c. and putting them together, and consider¬ 
ing their several virtues, he finds what will be the power and 
nature of the bolus, or any compound medicine, This is the 
synthetic method. 

But if we are better acquainted with the whole than we are 
with particular parts, then we divide or resolve the whole into 
its parts, and thereby gain a distinct knowledge of them. So in 
vulgar life we learn in the gross what plants and minerals arej 
and then by chemistry we gain the knowledge of salt, sulphur, 
spirit, water, earth, which are the principles of them. So we are 
first acquainted wit,h the body of an animal, and then by anatomy 

f Not*. It i$ confessed that synthesis often begins with the genus, and proceeds 
to the species and individuals. But the genus or generic nature is then considered 
only as a physical or essential part of the species, though it be sometimes called an 
universal or logical whole. Thus synthetic method maintains its own description 
still, for it begins with the parts } and proceeds to the whole which is composed of 
iftein. 


60 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK IV. 


and dissection we come to learn all the inward and outward parts 
of it. This is the analytic method. 

In ordinary things, these two kinds of method may be pre¬ 
served conspicuously, and entirely distinct; but the subjects of 
knowledge being infinite, and the ways whereby we arrive at this 
knowledge being almost infinitely various, it is very difficult, and 
almost impossible, always to maintain the precise distinction be¬ 
tween these two methods.* 


* This will evidently appear in the following observations. 
Obs. I. Analytic method being used chiefly to find out things 
unknown, it is not limited or confined merely to begin with some 
whole subject, and proceed to the knowledge of its parts, but it 
takes its rise sometimes from onesingle part or properly, or from 
any thing whatsoever that belongs to a subject which happens to 
be first and most easily known, and thereby enquires into the 
more abstruse and unknown parts, properties, causes, effects and 
modes of it, whether absolute and relative ; as for instance, 

(1.) Analysis finds out causes by their effects. So in the spe¬ 
culative part of natural philosophy, when we observe light, co¬ 
lours, motions, hardness, softness, and other properties and 
powers of bodies, or any of the common or uncommon appear¬ 
ances of things either on earth, or in heaven, we search out the 
causes of them. So by the various creatures we find out the 
Creator, and learn his wisdom, power, and goodness, 

(2.) It finds out effects by their causes. So the practical and 
mechanical part of natural philosophy considers such powers of 
motion, as the wind, the fire, the water, &c. and then contrives 
what uses they may be applied to, and what will be their effects 
in order to make mills and engines pf various kinds. 

(3.) It finds out the general and special nature of a thing by 
considering the various attributes of the individuals, and ob¬ 
serving what is common, and what is proper, what is accidental, 
and what is essential. So by surveying the colour, the shape, 
motion, rest, place, solidity, extension of bodies, we come to find 
that the nature of body in general is solid extension ; because all 
other qualities of bodies are changeable, but this belongs to all 
bodies, and it endures through all changes; and because this is 
proper to a body alone, and agrees not to any thing else ; and 
it is the foundation pf all other properties. 

( 4 .) It finds out the remaining properties or parts of a thin", 
by having some parts or properties given. So the area of a tn? 
angle is found by knowing the height and the base. So by having 
two sides, and an angle of a triangle given, we find the remaining 
side arid angles. So w hen we know cogitation is the prime at¬ 
tribute of a spirit, we infer its immateriality, and thence its itm* 
mortality. 



BOOK IV. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


61 


Arbitrary method leaves the order of nature, and accommo¬ 
dates itself to many purposes ; such as, to treasure up things, and 
retain them in memory ; to harangue and persuade mankind to 
any practice in the religious or civil life; or to entertain the 
mind. 

As for the assistance of the memory, in most things a natural 
order has an happy influence ; for reason itself deducing one 
thing from another, greatly assists the memory, by the natural 
connection and mutual dependence of things. But there are va¬ 
rious other methods which mankind have made use of for this 
purpose, and indeed there are some subjects which can hardly be 
deduced to analysis or synthesis'. 

In reading or writing history, some follow the order of the go- 


(5.) Analysis finds the means necessary to attain a proposed 
end, by having the end first assigned. So in moral, political, eco¬ 
nomical affairs, having proposed the government of self, a family, 
a society, or a nation, in order to their best interest, we consider 
and search out what are the proper laws, rules, and means to 
effect it. So in the practices of artificers, and the manufactures 
of various kinds, the end being proposed, as, making cloth, 
houses, ships, &c. we find out. ways of composing these tilings 
for the several uses of human life. But the putting any of these 
means in execution to attain the end, is synthetic method. 

Many other particulars might be represented, to shew the va¬ 
rious forms of analytic method, whereby truth is found out, and 
some of them come very near to synthetic, so as hardly to be 
distinguished.. 

Obs. II. Not only the investigation of truth, but the commu¬ 
nication of it also is often practised in such a method, as neither 
{agrees precisely to synthetic nor analytic. Some sciences, if you 
consider the whole of them in general, are treated in synthetic 
order; so physics, or natural philosophy, begins usually w ith an 
account of the general nature and properties of matter or bodies, 
and by degrees descends to consider the particular species of bo¬ 
dies, with their powers and properties; vet it is very evident, 
that when philosophers come to particular plants and animals, 
then by chemistry and anatomy they analyse or resolve these bo¬ 
dies into their several constituent parts. On the other hand. 
Logic is begun in analytic method.; the whole is divided into its 
integral parts, according to the four operations of the mind; yet 
here and there sy nthetic method is used in the particular branches 
of it, for it treats of the ideas in general first, and then descends 
to the several species of them ; it teaches us how propositions are 
made up of ideas, and syllogisms pf propositions, which i§ the 
order of compositions. 



ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


BOOK IV. 


<52 


vernors of a nation, and dispose every transaction under their 
particular reigns : so the sacred books of Kings and Chronicles are 
written. Some write in annals or journals, and make a new 
chapter of every year. Some put all those transactions together 
which relate to one subject: that is, all the affairs of one war, 
one league, one confederacy, one council, &c. though it last 
many years, and under many rulers. 

So in writing the lives of men, which is called Biography, 
some authors follow the tract of their years, and place every thing 
in the precise order of time when it occurred; others throw the 
temper and characters of the persons, their private life, their 
public stations, their personal occurrences, their domestic con** 
duct, their speeches, their books or writings, their sickness and 
death, into so many distinct chapters. 

In chronology, some writers divide their accounts of time ac* 
cording to the four great monarchies, Assyrian, Persian, Gre¬ 
cian, and Roman. Others think it serves the memory best to 
divide all their subjects into the number of sevens. And there is 
a book of divinity called Fosciculus Controversiorum by an au¬ 
thor of the same name, written in the same method, wherein 
every controversy ha3 seven questions belonging to it; though 
the order of nature seems to be too much neglected by a con** 
finement to this septenary number. 

Those writers and speakers whose chief business is to amuse 
and delight, or allure, terrify, or persuade mankind, do not con* 
fine themselves to any natural order, but in a cryptical or bidden 
method adapt every thing to their designed ends. Sometimes 
they omit those things which might injure their design, or grow 
tedious to their hearers, though they seem to have a necessary 
relation to the point in hand ; sometimes they add those things 
which have no great reference to the subject, but are suited to al¬ 
lure or refresh the mind and the ear. They dilate sometimes, 
upon certain incidents, and they lightly touch the drier part of 
their theme. They place the first things last, and the last things 
first, with wonderous art, and yet $q manage it as to conceal their 
artifice, and lead the senses and passions of their hearers into a 
pleasing and powerful captivity. 

It is chiefly poesy and oratory that requires the practice of this 
kind of arbitrary method : they omit things essential which are 
not beautiful, they insert little needless circumstances, and 
beautiful digressions, the invert tirpe and actions, in order to, 
place every thing in the most affecting light, and for this end in 
their practice they neglect all logical forpas; yet a good acquaints 


BOOK IV. 


ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 


63 


ance with the forms of logic and natural method, is of admirable 
use to those who would attain these arts in perfection. Hereby 
they will be able to range their own thoughts in such a method 
and scheme, as to make a more large and comprehensive survey 
of their subject and design in all the parts of it: and by this 
means they will better judge what to chuse and what to refuse; 
and how to dress and manage the whole scene before th6m, so as- 
to attain their own ends with greater glory and success. 


END OF THE ART OF LOGIC. 








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